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STATUTORY FORMS FOR CLOSELY HELD FIRMS
Business association statutes rarely are analyzed as ways to minimize
transaction costs.' Economists have focused on the choice between
organizing transactions within a firm or between firms,2 and have paid no
attention to questions concerning how these contracts are supplied. Lawyers
tend to assume that statutory business forms are artifacts of tax law,3 and
often fail to acknowledge transaction cost justifications for statutory
standard forms. Accordingly, a firm's decision to form, for example, a
limited partnership rather than a corporation has been of less interest to
commentators than, for example, a firm's choice of control structure.
Yet business association statutes raise several interesting and important
questions. Among other things, why do we observe the mix of business
forms that we do? Why are there so many different kinds of business
forms? Why are there not more, different types of forms? Is the current mix
of business types efficient, or is it driven by regulatory pressures, interest
groups, or market failures? Such questions are particularly apt for closely
held firms. Where expected revenues from a transaction are relatively
small, transaction costs, including those resulting from applicable legal
rules, can have large effects on the choice of transaction form.4 But if the
corporate form is unsuitable, why not substitute alternative unincorporated
business forms? One reason may be that the development of such forms has
been inhibited by tax and regulatory rules restricting the availability of
limited liability.5
These formerly neglected issues concerning statutory standard forms have
recently moved to prominence with the rapid emergence of the limited
liability company (LLC) and the limited liability partnership (LLP).6
I I have previously discussed one such business form. See Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory
,! Lomuted Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835 (1988).
2. The seminal works are those of Coase and Williamson, among others. See OLIVER E.
Wil LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Ronald
I I Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOP-
\INit 18 (Oliver Williamson & Sidney Winter eds., 1991).
3. See, e g-. Nancy J. Stara, Has the Uniform Partnership Act Been Superseded by Subchapter
R'. 41 DRAKE L. REV. 461 (1992).
4 See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365,
376-77 (1992) (arguing that the transaction costs of foreign incorporation for small firms, among other
problems, have impeded competition to supply close corporation statutes). But see Larry E. Ribstein,
Delaware, Lawyers and Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999 (1994) (discussing lawyers' role in
promoting competition regarding the law governing business associations and other contracts).
5. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70
WASH U. L Q. 417 (1992).
6. LLP statutes generally provide that partners are not liable for the malpractice of copartners as
long as they register and provide for a minimal level of insurance.
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During the relatively short period from early 1990 to mid-1994, forty-eight
of the fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions adopted LLC statutes,7 and approximate-
ly half of the states have adopted LLP provisions.8 These adoptions
occurred solely by the spontaneous actions of individual state legislatures,
without the intervention of a uniform lawmaking body.9
A better understanding of the functions of statutory standard forms is
made even more necessary by tax moves that are in the wind. The Internal
Revenue Service and Treasury Department recently announced an initiative
to drastically simplify tax classification rules by allowing domestic
unincorporated business organizations to elect whether to be treated as
partnerships for tax purposes.'" If adopted, this proposal would free
business forms from their tax fetters and encourage the development of still
more forms, possibly including corporate-like partnerships and all-purpose
statutory business association "menus."
The rapid rise of LLCs provides a laboratory in which to test theories
concerning statutory business forms. This Article evaluates three hypotheses
concerning closely held business association statutes. Part I discusses an
efficiency hypothesis under which these statutes are shaped so as to
minimize firms' transaction costs. This Part develops a model of what
7. The only exceptions are Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont. The statutes are included in full
text, summarized in tabular form and analyzed in 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINOE,
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES app. D (1992 & Supp. 1995).
8. These include, at the time this Article entered the final editing stage, Arizona (1994 Ariz.
Legis. Sew. Ch. 196, S.B. 1012 (West)); Connecticut (1994 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 94-218, S.S.B. 360
(West)); Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1502-1547 (Supp. 1994)); District of Columbia (1993 D.C.
Legis. Sewt. 10-34, Act 10-66 (West)) (codified in scattered sections of D.C. CODE § 41); 1995 Georgia
Laws Act 4 (H.B. 1994); Illinois (1994 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 88-573, S.B. 1448 (,Vest) (codified in
scattered sections of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 805); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 486.2-486.46 (West Supp.
1994)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-302 to 56-340 (Supp. 1994); Kentucky (1994 Ky. Legis. Serv.
ch. 389, S.B. 184 (West); Maryland (1994 Md. Laws ch. 494, S.B. 513 (West)); Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 449.15-.48 (Supp. 1994)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 319A.02-12, 323.02-39
(West Supp. 1995)); New York (N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKinney Supp. 1995));
North Carolina (1993 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 354, H.B. 923); Ohio (1994 Ohio Laws File 103, S.B. 74);
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-101 to 33-43-1409 (Law. Co-op. 1995); SD Legis. H.B. 1252
(1995). Texas (TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6132b-1.01 to 6312b-10.04 (West Supp. 1995)); and
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to 48-2b-156) (1994)).
9. For an empirical test of the tendency of LLC statutes toward spontaneous uniformity, see
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Uniformity, ECON. INQ. (forthcoming 1995 or
1996). After virtually all states had adopted or moved close to adoption of their LLC statutes, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did promulgate a Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act in the summer of 1994, which NCCUSL continued to rewrite into 1995. See
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (Reporter's Draft Mar. 8, 1995).
10. See I.R.S. Notice 95-14 (Mar. 30, 1995).
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efficient standard forms would look like based on an analysis of the
economic function of business association statutes. The Article later uses
this model to evaluate the actual LLC statutes that have been passed by the
states.
Part II discusses a tax/regulation hypothesis under which tax and
regulatory statutes shape business association statutes. This hypothesis is
generally consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, in the sense that
regulation is an important factor that legislators should take into account in
crafting transaction-cost-minimizing standard forms. However, isolating the
impact of regulation on the form of business association statutes helps in
evaluating the secondary costs of tax and regulatory statutes.
Part III discusses an inefficiency hypothesis under which the public
choice dynamics of legislatures, imperfect jurisdictional competition, and
inherent constraints on the development of new standard forms prevent the
development of efficient statutory standard forms.
Part IV then analyzes these theories of LLCs in light of the actual
development of LLCs. It provides both an overview of the origins and
evolution of LLC statutes and data concerning the structure of LLC statutes
and firms' selection of the LLC form.
Part V concludes and discusses some public policy implications of the
theories and evidence set forth in this Article. In general, the evolution of
the LLC strongly supports both the existence of jurisdictional competition
and the importance of tax and regulatory concerns in shaping state business
association statutes.
I. THE EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS
Under the efficiency hypothesis, legislators and others who influence
state legislation supply optimal statutory standard forms for closely held
firms, Part III discusses details concerning legislators' incentives and
interstate competition in the context of the inefficiency hypothesis. This
Part presents a general model of statutory standard forms for business
associations that can be used to test whether the actual development of the
LLC is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. It considers three
questions concerning statutory standard form contracts: (1) what is the
function of a standard form?; (2) why embody this standard form in a
statute?; and (3) why develop a new standard form in addition to existing
business forms that can be modified to closely resemble LLCs?
1995]
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A. The Role of Standard Forms
Standard forms save the parties to firms the costs of devising customized
terms for each contract. But how much do they save? Many firms vary
statutory governance terms in their bylaws, operating agreement or
certificate. Indeed, because most firms do not fit a single mold in important
respects, they can benefit from some customized drafting. Drafting a
comprehensive agreement does not necessarily cost much more than
selecting a few customized terms. Nevertheless, the following subparts
suggest five respects in which standard form terms can economize
transaction costs.
1. Default Terms for Firms Without Customized Contracts
Standard forms are most valuable in reducing costs for firms that
otherwise would not have any explicit contract. The marginal costs of
drafting customized terms may exceed the marginal benefits where
expected revenues from the transaction are relatively small. Accordingly,
parties to these firms may prefer to go without an explicit agreement and
risk having a dispute that is not covered by a contract. If a dispute occurs,
the absence of a contract may make the outcome unpredictable which, in
turn, may reduce the possibility of settlement and increase litigation costs.
This analysis suggests that standard terms should be designed for the
relatively small, informal firms that are least likely to be able to bear the
costs of drafting customized terms.
Some firms that do not have customized contracts nevertheless may not
need standard forms because their arrangements are so idiosyncratic that
such forms are of relatively little value." This may be the case for output
and supply contracts, which are highly specialized to particular buyers and
sellers. 2 But even standard forms that imperfectly suit idiosyncratic firms
may reduce litigation and other costs that otherwise would result from the
absence of well-defined rights.
11. See Roberta Romano, State Competition for Close Corporation Charters: A Commentary, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 413 (1992) (arguing that this characteristic explains the absence of competition to
supply close corporation charters). As discussed below, this argument is questionable, and is cast in
doubt by the rapid adoption and evolution of LLC statutes. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying
text.
12. However, as discussed infra text accompanying note 21, industries can and have developed
their own forms. Accordingly, the main difference between these types of contracts and conventional
business associations may concern the demand for statutory standard forms.
[VOL. 73:369
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2. Information Costs
Standard forms also can reduce investors' and creditors' costs of learning
the terms of each of the firms with which they contract. That is particularly
true for shareholders in publicly held firms who commonly invest small
portions of their portfolios in many firms. Although public securities
markets discount governance differences in stock prices, 3 market
efficiency varies by company, security, market and information.14 Thus,
the prices of relatively thinly traded stocks may reflect slowly, if at all,
information about the details of contract terms that is costly for investors
to acquire. Accordingly, standard forms may be particularly valuable in
reducing information costs not only for closely held firms, but also for
medium-sized publicly held firms that are not actively traded.
3. End-Period Terms
Many firms that have comprehensive agreements can gain from default
terms on particular issues where the costs of customized contracting are
likely to exceed the benefits. For example, it is more costly to include
contractual provisions covering the many circumstances that ultimately may
give rise to disagreement than it is to agree on the voting rules and other
terms that will govern normal operations.15 Moreover, the discounted
present benefit of rules governing disputes that are unlikely to occur for a
long time may be relatively low. On the other hand, merely because such
firms cannot deal practicably with these situations through customized
contracts, it does not follow that the firms would be helped by statutory
standard forms. Close corporations, whose disputes occur in nonrepeating
end-game situations, may prefer flexible judicial decisionmaking to rigid
legislative rules. 6
4. Terms Relating to Third Parties
Standardization may assist trade creditors and others whose costs of
learning the terms and entering into customized contracting may be high
13. For a summary of evidence of stock price reactions to governance changes, see ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 20-21 (1993).
14. See Jonathan R. Macey et aL, Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REv. 1017 (1991).
15 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESs ORGANIZATION & FINANCE (5th
ed 1993).
16 See ROMANO, supra note 13, at 27.
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compared to the value of the transaction, but who, at the same time, cannot
rely on efficient market pricing. This may explain the rules in corporate,
limited partnership and limited liability company statutes dealing with such
matters as distributions and registered agents for service of process.
5. Interpretive Networks
A statutory standard form potentially offers benefits similar to those of
an on-line computer network or telephone network in the sense that other
users of the network supply a complementary product. In the case of
standard form "networks," the other users generate such benefits as judicial
precedents, business practices and legal advice that help interpret and apply
the standard form." This information can increase the clarity of contract
terms by reducing errors of ambiguity, inconsistency and incomplete-
ness." However, interpretive benefits may be limited in some situations.
Case law and customs interpreting statutory terms may not be particularly
useful for firms whose problems are likely to be idiosyncratic. 9 More-
over, even in the absence of networks, statutes can provide clear rules on
matters such as contents of filings and firm name that do not normally give
rise to significant interpretive problems.
B. Statutory Standard Forms
Even if standard terms can reduce transaction costs, they need not be
produced by legislatures. Private organizations can supply standard forms,
such as the American Bar Foundation Model Debenture Indenture,
20
standard lease forms produced by associations of realtors, long-term output
and supply contracts and joint venture agreements devised for use in the
natural resources industry and informal codes of conduct or customs that
substitute for more formal statutes or contracts.2' Firms such as franchi-
17. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
Rv. (forthcoming 1995).
18. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 286-89 (1985) (discussing the benefits
produced by standardization of contract terms). For a discussion of the extent to which such benefits
can be increased by creating links between two or more statutory forms, see Larry E. Ribstein, Linking
Statutory Forms, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. (forthcoming 1995).
19. See ROMANo, supra note 13, at 26-27 (discussing idiosyncrasy of closely held firms as a
reason why close corporation statutes were slow to develop).
20. See Churchill Rodgers, The Corporate Trust Indenture Project, 20 Bus. LAW. 551 (1965)
(discussing history and goals of the project that developed this indenture).
21. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations In the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 115 (1992).
[VOL. 73:369
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sors that enter into similar contracts with many individuals may develop
their own standard contracts.
In general, statutes may be necessary to supply standard terms where
firms themselves cannot internalize the benefits of producing the standard
term either on their own or through a private organization. But the fact that
legislative action may be necessary to produce a standard form does not
alone explain the existence of statutory standard forms. First, benefit-
internalizing organizations are as necessary to create statutes as they are to
create private forms. Under standard interest group theory, legislators will
not necessarily legislate unless organizations and individuals pay them
campaign contributions and other benefits for doing so.22 Indeed, it is not
clear why organizations such as bar groups would pay to have legislators
create what these groups could create for themselves. Second, specific
industry groups need not internalize the benefits of drafting private codes
since lawyers may be able to internalize these costs for their clients. Third,
even if a well-designed statutory standard form might reduce transaction
costs in some respects, the particular statute produced by a legislature may
be unsuitable for many firms. The statute may even increase transaction
costs if firms must incur costs to avoid application of the form.'
Despite these considerations, the following discussion gives some
respects in which statutes may be preferable to private standard forms.
1. Information Costs
The publicity generated by the legislative process, publication of statutes
at state expense, and commentary on statutes by lawyers, academics and
others, lowers the public's costs of learning about the standard form as
compared with privately generated forms. This, in turn, reduces firms' costs
of doing business under the form. In evaluating this benefit, however, it is
important to note that a similar process can occur with respect to privately
generated forms. For example, a "Prototype Limited Liability Company
Act" promulgated by an ad hoc committee of the ABA quickly became as
22. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGic OF COLLECTIVE AcTION (1965); ROBERT TOLLISON
& ROBERT MCCORMICK, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY (1981).
23. The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) §§ 6-7 and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)
§ 202 provide that co-owned for-profit associations are partnerships and therefore subject to the statute.
UNIF, PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 6-7 (1914) [hereinafter UPA]; REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 202
(1993) [hereinafter RUPA]. Firms may shun "partnership characteristics" or may try to opt out of the
form by contracting that they are not part of the statutory class. See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 2:30 (1988 & Supp.) (citing and discussing
cases concerning effect of contracts providing that relationship is not a partnership).
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widely known as any state LLC statute through distribution at ABA
meetings and in private publications.24
2. Network Benefits and Statutory Forms
If, as predicted above, statutory standard forms are used more heavily
than equivalent private forms, they also will be more likely than their
private analogs to generate network benefits such as judicial precedents,
customs and practices that help in interpreting the terms." To be sure, the
value of judicial precedents in interpreting a particular term does not
depend on whether the term is included in a statutory or in a private
standard form. However, the number of precedents may depend on how
many firms use a particular term which, in turn, may depend on whether
the term is statutory or private. In other words, while potential network
benefits are the same for statutory and nonstatutory forms, statutes may be
able to create larger networks.
3. Mandatory Rules and Credible Commitments: The "Control Rule"
Mandatory rules in statutory standard forms can help the parties commit
to particular contract terms or refrain from certain types of conduct for long
periods.26 These commitments are important for long-term contracts such
as business associations. Enforcement costs and free rider problems may
prevent third parties from enforcing contracts that bind the parties to
particular governance terms. For example, changes in a management
arrangement could affect creditors as a whole, but the damage would be
difficult to quantify and may be slight for each creditor.
Creditors cannot easily overcome these problems by contract. Although
they could contract for collective enforcement rights, as through an
indenture trustee, creditors cannot easily collectivize different kinds of
claims incurred in different types of transactions at different times.
Alternatively, the creditors could contract for a penalty that would make
24. The Prototype Act was published as an appendix to 1 RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE, snpra note 7.
For data on the effect of the Prototype Act on LLC statutes, see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and LLCs, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming June 1995).
25. See supra Part I(A)(5).
26. Although statutory mandatory rules may reduce transaction costs in some circumstances, it
does not follow that they are always efficient. Mandatory rules can impose unsuitable terms on firms
or require them to choose an otherwise suboptimal form or to incur the costs of organizing under the
law of a state other than their main place of business. Moreover, legislators may have perverse
incentives to enact mandatory rules at the behest of a powerful interest group, such as trial lawyers, or
to enhance their own power. See infra Part HI(A).
[VOL. 73:369
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enforcement by individual creditors cost-effective. For example, the equity
owners could agree to give creditors special collection rights triggered by
certain governance changes. Such terms might, however, be considered
unenforceable "penalties" if they bear no relation to actual damages. 7
Statutes that provide rules for limited liability firms normally include
unwaivable penalty rules that help solve these creditor enforcement
problems. For example, the statute may prohibit the firm from making
distributions under certain circumstances. Owners who do not comply risk
losing their limited liability through "veil-piercing" or having to return
excessive distributions. 8
The limited partnership "control rule," which holds limited partners liable
as general partners for taking part in the control of the business,"
arguably is an example of a statutory creditor-protection penalty. The
general partners' personal liability helps align their interests with creditors.
The control rule reinforces this alignment by assuring creditors that limited
partners cannot initiate or approve transactions rejected by the general
partners. The rule also assures the general partners, who have agreed to be
personally liable for the firm's debts, that the limiteds will not increase
these debts without the generals' consent. Without the control rule, the
limited partners might be able to amend the agreement or otherwise remove
the general partners and take over management functions. The limited
partners may have a particularly strong incentive to take such action when
the firm nears insolvency, because owners who have no equity stake can
shift the entire cost of the failure of risky investments to creditors and
general partners.30
27. See generally Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
554 (1977). This reasoning suggests that statutes are only a second-best solution to simply providing
for enforcement of liquidated damage clauses whether or not they amount to "penalties."
28. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 304 (1985) [hereinafter RULPA] (liability
of partners in noncomplying partnerships); id. §§ 607-608 (liability for excessive distributions). This
is not to suggest that all such rules are optimal. See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 888-89 (arguing that rules
limiting distributions are unnecessary and inefficient).
29. See UPA § 7 (1914); RULPA § 303 (1985). Note that the Revised Act provides that only
creditors who are misled about the limited partners' status can recover. RULPA § 303(a). This dilutes
the control rule so that it merely duplicates the "partner-by-estoppel" theory of UPA § 16 rather than
providing assurances concerning who will exercise control.
30. This conflict of interest is well illustrated in the corporate context by Credit Lyonnais Bank
v Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12190, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). The
court held that members of an executive committee that was running a very heavily leveraged firm
under a corporate governance agreement did not breach their duty to defendant, a 98% shareholder, by,
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Other contracting devices could not easily accomplish the same results.
The alternative of imposing creditor-protection duties on managing limited
partners raises intractable issues concerning the types of obligations this
would entail, given the inherent conflict of interest between owners and
creditors and the fact that courts generally have refused to recognize such
a duty.3" Although the limited partnership agreement could forbid the
limited partners from managing and from amending the agreement to
remove this prohibition, this restriction could expose the limited partners
to the risk of mismanagement by undisciplined general partners. Moreover,
sufficiently desperate limited partners and insolvent general partners might
agree unanimously to ignore a prohibition. A later court decision that the
partners lacked the power to change the management structure would give
little comfort to creditors whose debts became uncollectible as a result of
the owners' risky maneuvers or questionable conveyances.
The statutory control rule, therefore, solves a difficult contracting
problem. It provides some protection to creditors and general partners from
the potentially severe agency costs that arise in connection with insolvency
by ensuring that the controlling partners remain personally liable for the
firm's debts. At the same time, it protects the limited partners from
potentially large agency costs vis-A-vis the general partners by giving the
limiteds the power to take over management. In light of this explanation,
it makes sense that the control rule imposes liability only on limited
partners who manage, and not on nonowners: only residual claimants would
have a perverse incentive to run the firm contrary to creditors' interests.32
C. Differences Among Statutory Standard Forms
A final issue concerning statutory standard business association forms is
the circumstances that give rise to different statutes. Because the statutes
include mostly default terms that can be varied by contrary agreement,
among other things, refusing to sell certain assets. Id. at *21. Chancellor Allen discussed at length the
potential conflict of interest between creditors and owners. Id. at *34 n.55.
31. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). In the Credit Lyonnais
case, discussed supra note 30, Chancellor Allen, who also decided Katz, reasoned that managers did
not breach their duty in refusing to engage in an asset sale that would have benefited the shareholders,
because the managers "owed their supervening loyalty to ... the corporate entity." Credit Lyonnais,
1991 WL 277613, at *34. However, Chancellor Allen did not suggest that the managers would have
breached their duty to creditors if they had sold the assets. For a good discussion of the problems in
this context of recognizing a general duty to the "corporate entity," see C. Robert Morris, Directors'
Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993).
32. See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 885.
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different types of firms can adapt the statutes to their needs. Although it
may be appropriate to provide alternative default terms for each aspect of
a business association to suit different types of firms, statutes could meet
this demand by offering a "Chinese menu" of terms. For example, states
could let firms choose a transfer provision from Category A and a
dissolution provision from Category B. Also, rather than enacting LLC
statutes, legislatures could offer an apparent equivalent to an LLC statute
by allowing limited partnerships to opt out of the control rule.33 Alterna-
tively, legislatures could create LLCs out of partnerships simply by
allowing partnerships to adopt limited liability.3 4 The following subparts
suggest answers to these questions and explain why a new LLC statutory
form is the desired alternative.
1. Coherent Sets of Terms
Although the "Chinese menu" approach could work for firms that have
customized contracts, such firms probably have little need for standard
forms. For firms that use standard forms in order to avoid excessive
customizing costs, selecting among menu items also may not be cost-
justified. This is because selecting menu items for a business association,
unlike a restaurant meal, involves complex interactions among choices in
order to produce a coherent set of terms.
Constructing a coherent set of terms involves trade-offs at the margin.
For example, it is inefficient to combine two or more costly monitoring
devices where the marginal cost of each additional device exceeds its
marginal benefit. Accordingly, regulatory considerations aside,35 providing
for limited liability and direct management in a separate statute may be
more efficient than allowing general partnerships to adopt limited liability,
as has been done through LLP statutes.36 Some provisions of general
partnership statutes may be efficient when combined with individual
liability of the partners, but not if the partners have limited liability. For
example, giving each partner the power to liquidate the firm at will may
involve excessive costs if liquidation is unnecessary to free dissociating
33 Legislatures could even allow "limited partnerships" to opt out of the requirement that the
partnership have at least one general partner. States already allow something close-the incorporated
general partner. See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 868-71.
34. For a list of "limited liability partnership" statutes which have done that, see supra note 8.
35 See infra Part II.
36 These statutes probably are better explained by regulatory considerations than under the
efficiency hypothesis. See infra Part II(C).
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partners from continued exposure to predissociation liabilities.37
The efficiency of combining terms into coherent sets also explains why
a separate business form for limited-liability, closely held firms is more
efficient than adapting the corporate form to closely held firms. Even if
corporation statutes allow complete flexibility, closely held firms must still
attempt to anticipate the potential impact of each element of the corporate
form and draft around inappropriate terms. This negates an important
function of standard forms, to provide defaults for split-ups and other
circumstances that are costly to anticipate and draft for on formation.38
Since firms are unlikely to draft customized terms for these situations,
courts would have to supply judicial buyout and dissolution remedies. This
can increase unpredictability and litigation costs.
2. Gap-Filling
Separate business association statutes let firms adopt not only particular
terms but also a general structure. This helps courts decide cases that are
not resolved by the statute or by the firms' customized contracts. For
example, a firm's decision to incorporate, even if the resulting form adopts
several partnership features, indicates that courts should fill gaps in
situations not expressly provided for in the statute or the certificate by
defaulting back to such corporate features as continuity of life, free
transferability and centralized management. It follows that courts should be
reluctant to order a buyout of owners of a close corporation in the absence
of a showing that the statutory grounds have been met.39
3. Combining Flexibility and Mandatory Rules
Offering different statutory standard forms facilitates the combination of
desirable mandatory rules" and customized contracting. Firms could
choose either to bind themselves to mandatory rules such as the limited
partnership "control rule," or to avoid the rule by selecting an alternative
business form. The rule would be mandatory in the sense of inhibiting
firms from making midstream changes without dissolving and paying off
37. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49
BUS. LAW. 45, 69-75 (1993) (noting that partners' personal liability may justify liquidation at will, but
arguing that this remedy is unnecessary even in light of partners' liability).
38. See supra Part I(A)(3).
39. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 238-39 (1991); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation
Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1992).
40. See supra Part I(B)(3) (discussing reasons for mandatory statutory rules).
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creditors." On the other hand, if the control rule were part of a Chinese
menu-type statute the firm could change the rule without the consent of
third parties simply by choosing another term.4"
D. Efficiency Implications for Statutory Design
This Part has outlined the economic functions of statutes for various
types of business associations. In general, standard terms can reduce firms'
contracting and information costs as compared with fully customized
contracts; statutory terms can be superior to privately drafted forms in some
circumstances by supplying efficient mandatory rules, reducing information
costs and providing a base for developing judicial gap-filling rules; and
discrete statutes can provide signaling and offer coherent sets of terms for
firms that would not incur the costs of choosing such terms from a master
"'menu."
It follows from this general analysis that there is an efficiency justifica-
tion for a business association statute that is distinct from general
partnership in providing for limited liability, and from other limited liability
forms (i.e., corporation and limited partnership) in providing for direct
member participation in management. The history of close corporations
demonstrates that some firms do, in fact, demand this combination of
features.43 This Part has shown that the features should be offered in a
distinct, internally consistent statute rather than simply being made
available as a menu item or customized term. Under the principle of
internal consistency, such a statute would build on the concept of direct
management by restricting transferability of shares and offering liquidity in
the form of easy dissolution. Providing for a distinct and internally
consistent business form would assist courts in filling gaps by signaling that
the owners intended to rely on direct participation in management and easy
41. Note that this efficiency justification for mandatory rules is based on problems associated with
midstream changes. Where midstream switching is not a concern, mandatory rules are harder to justify.
As long as the firm discloses its terms at the outset of any deal, the parties presumably can contract
accordingly. As discussed infra Part III, many mandatory rules are more consistent with the inefficiency
hypothesis than with the limited efficiency justification for mandatory rules discussed here.
42. The differences between menus and separate statutes regarding mandatory rules may blur in
this respect. A separate statute could let firms escape mandatory terms midstream by converting or
merging into a different standard form without paying off minority owners or creditors, while a menu
statute could provide that firms cannot drop the "control rule" without a dissolution-type procedure.
43, Limited liability has been explained primarily in the context of publicly traded firms. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 40-41. However, there are also strong reasons to believe
that limited liability can be an efficient contract term in closely held firms. See Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80, 101-06 (1991).
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exit rather than on other devices, such as fiduciary duties, for controlling
manager discretion. In general, this approach would eliminate the
awkwardness that has resulted from trying to adapt the corporate form to
closely held firms.
As discussed in Part IV, the LLC as it has evolved in state statutes is, in
fact, consistent with this general model of an efficient statute for closely
held firms. This provides evidence supporting the efficiency hypothesis.
II. THE TAX/REGULATION HYPOTHESIS
Under the tax/regulation hypothesis, statutes for closely held firms are
designed to some extent with a view toward helping firms obtain favorable
treatment under tax and regulatory statutes. Most importantly, firms that
adopt statutory partnership features are taxed as partnerships on a flow-
through basis rather than as separate entities like corporations. The data on
the evolution of LLC statutes shows that tax classifications have affected
LLC statutes, particularly with respect to the minimum number of
members, limitations on transfer, and continuity of the firm.4 Indeed, the
most recent LLC statute explicitly provides that it should be applied so as
to "permit a limited liability company to qualify for taxation as an entity
that is not an association taxable as a corporation under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986." 4
5
Subpart A discusses the efficiency of the underlying tax classification
scheme. Subpart B shows that, irrespective of the efficiency of the
classification scheme, designing business association statutes in light of tax
considerations may be consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, in the
sense that an efficient statute would minimize firms' transaction costs in
light of their tax and regulatory needs. Subpart C discusses analogous
regulatory considerations in designing business association statutes.
A. Efficiency of Tax Classification
A business is taxed as a partnership under Subchapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code (i.e., on a "flow-through" basis, with income taxed directly
to the owners and losses deductible against owners' income) if it is not a
"corporation." The Code defines this term to include "association."46 In
44. See infra Parts IV(C)(2), (4) and (8).
45. 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 8915 (Supp. 1994).
46. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1988) (definition of "corporation"); id. § 7701(a)(2) (definition of
"partnership').
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Morrissey i. Commissioner,47 the Supreme Court approved a test to
determine "association" status based on an entity's "resemblance" to
corporations.4" The current "resemblance" test adopts the IRS' interpreta-
tion set forth in the "Kintner regulations,"49 and provides that a business
organization is a corporation and not a partnership if it has at least three of
the following characteristics: continuity of life, centralized management,
limited liability, and free transferability of interests."0
These tax classification provisions are inefficient to the extent that they
rely on an inherent distinction between partnerships and corporations. The
characteristics that define "associations" (i.e., nonpartnerships) for tax
purposes are neither immutably associated with particular types of business
associations nor rationally related to the way the firm ought to be taxed."
More importantly, requiring firms to have particular characteristics in order
to be taxed as partnerships could perversely cause firms to adopt terms that
increase transaction costs solely in order to reduce tax costs. 2 For
example, rigid restrictions on continuation of the firm after member
dissociation and on transferability of shares, while helpful for tax
classification purposes, may impose extra transaction costs on most limited
liability firms.
Commentators have struggled to find a more defensible basis for the one-
tier/two-tier tax distinction. They have proposed tests based on liquidity of
interests" and on member participation in management, 4 or have
47. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
48. Id. at 357.
49. The name refers to the case that prompted the regulations, United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1954), in which the IRS unsuccessfully sought to characterize a professional corporation
as a partnership. Id. at 428.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). For leading cases interpreting the
Kintner regulations, see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Comm'r,
66 T C. 159 (1976).
51. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 451-56.
52. Id. at 456-67. Statutory terms could serve a tax function without significantly increasing
transaction costs. Statutes could be used simply to reduce the costs of identifying classes of transactions
for different tax consequences by providing a mechanism for grouping the firms with partnerships,
rather than with corporations, for tax purposes. In other words, firms could be allowed to choose their
tax treatment by organizing under such statutes. This approach would not give firms complete freedom
to reduce taxes as long as the statute imposes drafting and other transaction costs on firms that are not
suited to the statutory defaults. For example, a publicly traded corporation would have to draft around
transfer, dissolution and management provisions of statutes designed for closely held firms. Even with
such a contract, the firm still would risk application of inappropriate default terms to situations not
covered by the express contract.
53. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE
W RES. L. REV. 965 (1989).
54. See Joseph A. Snoe, Entit, Classification Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Proposal to
Replace the Resemblance Model, 15 J. CORP. L. 647 (1990).
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suggested that two-tier taxation may reduce owner-manager agency costs
by removing managers' incentives to time asset dispositions." The
liquidity test is based on the suspect assumption that such a test will not
have implications for the choice of organizational form. 6 The agency-cost
test questionably assumes that a costly tax rule is an efficient way of
constraining agency costs. 57 In any event, none of these arguments
defends the current multifactor approach, although the liquidity approach
comes closest to describing the closely-held/publicly-held distinction that
is emerging in practice. 8
The current approach is not only difficult to defend on efficiency
grounds, but from at least one perspective seems particularly perverse.
Traditionally, the double tax is a tax on limited liability. Yet, by
permitting closely held firms to adopt the single-level tax, the current tax
classification scheme encourages firms to distribute assets precisely in the
situation in which this is most likely to hurt creditors-in relatively small-
capitalization firms, where those who make the distribution decisions are
themselves owners who would have the most to gain from externalizing
risk."
Distinguishing closely held and publicly held firms might be justified on
the public interest ground that the agency costs inherent in an entity-level
tax are highest where owners can neither control distribution decisions nor
create "homemade dividends" by selling or easily borrowing against their
interests.6 Alternatively, the distinction might be explained on public
choice grounds as resulting from pressure by manager-owners for tax rules
55. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of lncorporation, 77
VA. L. REV. 211 (1991); see also Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration: An
Agency Cost Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 29 (1993)
(discussing alternative agency cost implications of single- and two-tier taxation).
56. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 471-73.
57. Id. at 469-71.
58. Id. at 471-72. Kanda and Levmore's agency-cost test assumes that the parties can choose the
tax rule that applies, which is not the case. The IRS has implicitly rejected a participation-in-
management test by permitting partnership-type taxation of centrally managed LLCs on the basis of the
four-factor test. See Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (ruling that an LLC formed under the Colorado
Limited Liability Company Act would be treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes despite
having centralized management mandated by the Colorado Act, because it lacked continuity of life and
free transferability of interests).
59. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 453-56. For a criticism of this basis of the tax classification
system, see id. at 467-69.
60. See supra text accompanying note 30 (discussing this point as part of creditor-protection
rationale of the control rule).
61. See Snoe, supra note 55, at 34-39.
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that allow them to take earnings from the firm without an additional tax
penalty.6
2
If a particular tax classification rule cannot be defended, perhaps a clear
rule, even if it rests arbitrarily on choice of business form, can be defended
on efficiency grounds. Such a rule may reduce litigation and uncertainty
costs as compared with a more open-ended definition.
63
Whatever the justification or explanation for the tax classification rules,
they cannot be evaluated fully without considering the extent to which they
encourage statutory provisions and contracts that would be suboptimal in
the absence of the tax rules. The tax/regulation hypothesis articulated in the
next subpart provides an approach to measuring these costs.
B. Tax Effects on Business Association Statutes
Given the current tax classification rules, there may be a public interest
justification for designing a business association statute to ensure that firms
using the statute lack at least two of the corporate characteristics identified
in the Kintner regulations. If partnership tax consequences dwarf transaction
cost considerations, there is a public interest justification for providing tax-
oriented terms even if perverse tax motivations would not exist in a perfect
world. The tax/regulation hypothesis also suggests a reason for separate
business association statutes as opposed to letting firms choose from a
menu of provisions. Providing a coherent set of interrelated terms helps
characterize a firm for tax purposes in the same way that it helps courts to
characterize the firm for purposes of filling contractual gaps.
64
On the other hand, a business association statute should not be designed
to help firms minimize tax liability if the transaction costs of a tax-oriented
statute can be expected to overwhelm any tax-related advantages. 5 In
particular, tax rules may not justify mandatory business association
statutory provisions that prevent firms from trading off tax advantages and
nontax transaction costs. Such rules may be explained by political
62. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, The Political Economy of Double Corporate Taxation
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
63. See Larry E. Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of
Limited Liability Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 807, 829-30 (1994).
64. See stpra Part l(C)(2).
65. Note that the transaction cost tradeoffs inherent in tax-oriented terms may be hard to determine
because the design of the business association statute may affect the design of the tax statute-i.e.,
where the tax rule borrows from the business associations rule or new business forms lead to the
fomiation of interest groups that lobby for tax flexibility.
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considerations and are consistent with the inefficiency hypothesis.66
C. Regulatory Considerations
Business association statutes may be designed to serve regulatory as well
as tax functions. Most importantly, a decentralized-management default
statutory term justifies characterizing firms organized under such statutes
as non"securities" for state and federal securities law purposes. General
partnerships have been characterized as virtually per se nonsecurities67
because partners' direct participation in management tends to negate the
"efforts-of-others" prong of the basic test in SEC v. Howey6t for the
definition of a security. A similar analysis would be appropriate for LLCs
if they are generally recognized as a decentralized-management form.69
66. See infra text accompanying note 82.
67. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.) (leading case recognizing the very heavy
presumption against "security" in the general partnership context), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships, 42
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 47-54 (1992) (discussing cases supporting "per se" approach).
68. 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946).
69. See I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, § 14.02; Ribstein, supra note 63, at 816-23. For
similar conclusions concerning LLC interests as "securities," see Carol Goforth, Why Limited Liability
Company Membership Interests Should Not Be Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage
the Result, 45 HAsTINGs L.J. 1223 (1994); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests
Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1069 (1992). For a contrasting approach, concluding that LLCs are
generally nonsecurities, see Marc L. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as
a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1105 (1992).
Some states have chosen to clarify the characterization of LLCs by revising the definition of a
"security" in their securities statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (Supp. 1994) (defining LLC
interest as security); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that LLC interest not a
security ifLLC can prove that all of its members are actively engaged as managers); IND. CODE § 23-2-
1-1 (k) (iii) (Bums Supp. 1994) (defining LLC interest as security unless person claiming it is not a
security can prove that all of the members are actively engaged in management); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.01 (Anderson Supp. 1994) (defining LLC interests as securities); 1994 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1994-126
(H.B. 2075) (Purdon's) (providing that LLC interests are "securities" unless the LLC is not managed
by managers, the purchaser of the membership interest enters into a written commitment to be engaged
actively and directly in the management of the company and the purchaser of the membership interest,
in fact, does participate actively and directly in the management of the company); WIS. STAT.
§ 551.02(13)(c) (Supp. 1994) (presuming LLC interest to be a "security" if the right to manage the LLC
is vested in one or more managers or if the LLC has more than 35 members).
There are analogous problems in determining whether an LLC should be treated as a "corporation"
under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (Supp. V 1993) (defining "corporation"). See I
RiBSTEiN & KEATiNGE, supra note 7, § 14.04. Decentralization is significant in this context in
determining whether partnership rules should control initiation of the proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 301
(1988) (requiring unanimity for initiation ofvoluntary partnership bankruptcy). In this respect, the actual
form of management adopted by the LLC-i.e., whether it is managed by members or managers-rather
than the default provision should be controlling. However, the limited liability of an LLC may justify
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Regulatory considerations can arise unexpectedly. For example, a firm was
forced to change from an LLC to a corporate structure when questions were
raised whether it was structured by one of its owners to circumvent foreign
ownership laws and regulatory limits on how many television stations one
company can own."
Regulatory considerations are particularly important in explaining the
development of LLPs.7 Partnerships with limited liability seem perverse
from a pure transaction-cost standpoint because limited liability fits poorly
with other elements of the partnership form.7' Moreover, under most LLP
statutes the firm might forgo the complete limitation of owner liability that
it otherwise would have adopted solely to maximize the chance that it will
be characterized as a partnership for regulatory purposes. However, LLPs'
function becomes clearer in the light of regulatory considerations. The
application of many types of regulation potentially turn on whether a firm
is formally a "partnership." These include not only the securities laws, as
discussed immediately above, but also employment discrimination
statutes. 73
As with the effect of tax rules, even if regulation that forces firms to
make perverse transaction-cost choices is itself inefficient, statutory terms
such as LLP provisions may be an efficient way to help firms adapt to this
regulation.
treating even a member-managed LLC as a "corporation" under bankruptcy law because of the
importance of limited liability to the handling of the bankrupt estate.
70 Elizabeth Jensen, SF Broadcasting Acts to Speed FCC Clearance, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1994,
at B9.
71. See supra note 8 (listing statutes). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for
Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CiN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (discussing regulatory, tax and other
considerations underlying the development of the LLP form).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
73. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
partnership was "employer" for purposes of age discrimination laws but that those laws did not regulate
relationship among law partners); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257,277 (10th Cir.) (refusing to apply
antidiscrimination law to partner in large accounting firm), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 988 (1987); 1
BROMBERG & RIBsTEEN, supra note 23, at 1:33.
Recent courts have refused to adopt a "per se" test, holding instead that the test as to the application
of the discrimination laws is whether the person is a "bona fide" partner. See Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 663 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that plaintiff should be treated as an employee
rather than a "bona fide" partner under age discrimination laws); Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that plaintiff was a nonemployee partner because he shared profits and
losses, was jointly and severally liable for firm debts, voted as a partner, had a sufficient voting interest
to block partnership decisions in combination with one other partner, participated in hiring decisions
and could be terminated only by unanimous vote of the other partners). Although these cases suggest
that the LLP vs. LLC strategy may not be completely effective, technical partnership status may create
enough of a presumption against "employee" treatment to make the strategy pay off for many firms.
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D. Implications
The tax/regulation hypothesis implies that the presence or absence of
competition among business forms depends critically on tax and regulatory
rules that bear on the costs and benefits of competing forms rather than on
inherent defects in the market for business forms. Thus, the evolution of
business association statutes for closely held firms may have been limited
by tax classification rules that constrained the development of flexible
forms. This observation is confirmed by the fact that active state develop-
ment of LLCs began the instant the IRS signaled a new flexibility by
sanctioning partnership tax treatment for LLCs.74
The tax/regulation hypothesis may be tested empirically if the IRS
follows through on a recent tentative proposal to allow certain unincorpo-
rated firms to elect whether to be treated as partnerships for tax
purposes.75 Under the tax/regulation hypothesis, this proposal should
further encourage the growth of unincorporated firms by increasing the
significance of the state law classification of the firm as a corporation or
a partnership. At the same time, it should eliminate tax-classification
reasons for structuring unincorporated firms in particular ways. Thus, tax-
oriented but otherwise inefficient rules in limited liability company statutes
will be eliminated.
III. THE INEFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS
This Part examines reasons why legislators might pass inefficient
statutory standard form rules. Subpart A considers the extent to which
political forces are likely to cause adoption of inefficient provisions.
Subpart B discusses network externalities as an explanation for inefficient
LLC terms. Subpart C focuses on herding and limited information as a
cause of inefficiency. Finally, subpart D shows how inefficient statutes may
be constrained by jurisdictional competition.
A. Rent-Seeking and Interest Groups
This subpart discusses two groups whose interests may be important in
shaping LLC legislation-legislators and lawyers.
74. See infra Parts IV(A), IV(B)(2).
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Note that the proposal would not affect tax
treatment under rules applicable to certain types of firms, such as the rule which taxes publicly traded
partnerships as corporations. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1988).
[VOL. 73:369
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss2/1
STATUTORY FORMS FOR CLOSELY HELD FIRMS
1. Legislators
Legislators may act as brokers who pass laws in return for "rents" from
interest groups, including contributions, political support and potential
future employment. They also may serve their own interests in adopting
legislation that maximizes their future rent-seeking ability. Accordingly,
legislators may resist adopting LLC or other statutory provisions that are
consistent with the public interest criteria discussed in Part I because such
provisions would reduce their expected rents from future laws relating to
closely held firms. For example, legislators might seek to maximize both
the number of mandatory rules in business association statutes and the
complexity of default provisions. As legislators pass more mandatory
statutory rules, parties to firms must rely increasingly on legislators' help
to adjust their relationships. For example, consider a statute that lets
members transfer their management power only by unanimous consent of
the nonassigning members and does not allow members to vary the
statutory rule. If changes in LLC practice made consent requirements
particularly costly, LLC members would have to apply for legislative
approval of provisions allowing transfers with a lower vote.76 This is
analogous to legislators' sale of corporate charters in the early history of
corporate law.77
Even statutory default rules can impact legislators' power. Complex and
detailed default provisions increase legislators' opportunities to change
existing contracts by changing default rules. This, in turn, invites contract-
ing parties to pay rents to legislators rather than investing in private
renegotiation of contracts. Elaborate formal requirements for changing
statutory defaults, such as detailed amendment and merger procedures,
similarly lend themselves to legislative manipulation.
Mandatory rules may be efficient. The discussion of the limited
partnership "control rule," for example," suggests that there may be an
efficiency justification for a mandatory rule that prevents firms from
opportunistically opting out of rules in midstream when parties' incentives
76. Although contracting parties might want to change default rules, it will usually be more cost-
effective for them to simply bargain around the rule rather than to pursue a statutory change.
77. For accounts of the sale of charters and how jurisdictional competition ultimately broke down
this practice, see Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985).
78. See supra Part I(B)(3).
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change. But, in many situations, prohibiting firm-specific contracting could
impose burdens on LLCs that exceed the rules' benefits. For example,
requiring LLCs to disclose the details of all member contributions would
impose significant buidens on LLCs and perhaps channel the parties to
otherwise less suitable transaction forms. At the same time, third party
creditors probably would derive little benefit from such disclosures, since
member contributions are only a small part of the firms' general
creditworthiness.
2. Lawyers
Lawyers may be the most powerful interest group that would demand
LLC statutory provisions.79 Because lawyers are well organized into bar
groups, they can overcome free rider problems that impede small business
owners in collectively seeking legislation. Moreover, lawyers can provide
politicians not only with campaign funds and votes, but also with drafting
services and jobs for legislators who are also lawyers.
Lawyers may gain from the adoption of new limited liability business
forms such as LLCs and LLPs in ways that are adverse to their clients'
interests. For example, lawyers can reduce their risk-bearing costs by using
the LLC form in their own practices. Although lawyers and other
professionals are subject to ethical and legal restrictions on limitation of
liability that apply irrespective of the form of organization, 0 they could
use an additional partnership-type limited liability business form as an
opportunity to press for a relaxation of restrictions on limited liability.
Lawyers also may seek adoption of provisions in business association
statutes that reduce their exposure to malpractice liability. One possible
source of malpractice liability is the attorney's failure to achieve the flow-
through partnership-type taxation the clients expected. The characteristics
79. For a discussion of lawyers' influence on corporate law, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporation Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469
(1987).
80. With respect to legal restrictions on limiting lawyer liability, see generally ROBERT W.
HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY 6:6-6:20 (1994). With respect to ethical restrictions on
limiting lawyer liability, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102, EC 6-6
(1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(i) (1992). With respect to accountants, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) amended its Rule 505 in 1991 to expand
the forms of business in which accountants could practice. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 505 (1994). The rule as amended has been interpreted as permitting accountants to practice as
LLCs, subject to state law. See Memorandum from Helene Kennedy, Director, Communications and
Public Relations of the AICPA, to State Society Executive Directors and Communications Directors
(June 13, 1991).
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that determine whether LLCs and other firms are taxed as partner-
ships-i.e., continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability and
free transferability of interests-are not always easy to determine. 1 For
example, it may not be clear what level of consent to transfer of manage-
ment rights is enough to remove the corporate characteristic of free
transferability. Lawyers may bear the costs of an adverse tax ruling without
receiving the transaction-cost benefits of suitable terms. Moreover, nontax
lawyers might have to acquire some expertise in tax law or refer cases to
tax specialists. Accordingly, lawyers might advocate mandatory statutory
provisions that reduce the possibility of adverse tax consequences even if
their clients would prefer to be able to adapt the statutes to their needs.
Lawyers also may advocate mandatory provisions that force clients to
seek legal advice in drafting their agreements. For example, the parties
need legal advice to navigate intricate restrictions on fiduciary duty
waivers.82 They would also need legal advice to ensure that they have
complied with formalities that are prerequisites to limited liability and to
avoid restrictions on distributions. Moreover, any change in complex
default terms and mandatory rules requires review and change of existing
agreements.
These lawyer-benefit explanations for statutory rules do not require that
lawyers actually dominate the drafting process. To be sure, lawyers acting
as statutory drafters might press for such provisions irrespective of whether
firms generally would want them in the statutes. But nonlawyer drafters
may recognize that lawyers ultimately will make self-interested decisions
for clients on whether to adopt the statute, just as corporate managers can
influence corporations' choice of chartering state.
Several factors limit the perverse effects of lawyer influence on business
association statutes. First, prolawyer provisions in business association
statutes do not necessarily hurt clients. For example, limited liability would
not necessarily significantly reduce client protection.83 The firm's assets
and reputation, as well as partners' individual assets, would continue to
81. For a discussion of the uncertainty inherent in applying these classification factors, see
Ribstein, supra note 5, at 461-65.
82. See Ribstein, supra note 37, at 60-61. (criticizing such restrictions in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act). Lawyers' advocacy of complexity in this regard is not inconsistent with their advocacy
of mandatory tax-characterization rules. Advising on compliance with complex and mandatory business
association-type rules does not involve the same problem of crossover expertise as advice on tax
characterization, and consequently does not pose an equivalent risk of malpractice liability.
83. For a general discussion of the policy arguments favoring limited liability of professionals, see
Ribstein, supra note 5, at 434-36.
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serve as a bond against partner misconduct. Monitoring by other profes-
sionals remote from the work being done for the client is often less useful
than monitoring by the clients themselves, particularly through corporate
legal and accounting departments.84
Second, competition in the professional services market can mitigate the
potential impact of prolawyer statutory provisions. Clients theoretically can
adjust the fees they are willing to pay based on whether the firm has
limited liability and on indicia of the firm's future performance. Thus,
statutes permitting lawyers to limit their personal liability may help rather
than hurt clients by opening up competition in the legal services market.
Indeed, smaller firms might advocate mandatory personal liability to
increase the cost of capital and decrease the potential size of their larger
competitors.8"
Third, lawyers and clients have common interests in important respects.
For example, a statute that furthers client interests by providing a better
organizational form also generates legal fees for lawyers as clients seek to
further their interests by switching to the new form.
B. Network Externalities
Even if legislators have incentives to supply statutes that parties to firms
want, the parties themselves may lack incentives to adopt new standard
forms. This is an aspect of the "network benefits" point discussed in Part
I.86 The extent and number of these networks may be suboptimal because
each user gains only part of the benefit she confers by joining the
network 8 --i.e., networks may involve positive externalities. This
84. See Jack L. Carr & G. Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal
Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307, 322-23 (1990).
85. See Jack L. Carr & G. Frank Mathewson, Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry, 96 J. POL.
ECON. 766 (1988). This may explain the recent tentative move in the American Law Institute to
mandate personal liability of attorneys irrespective of the form of organization. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, tentative draft 7, § 79 cmt. C (Apr. 7, 1994). Under the
analysis in the text, a uniform rule would insulate small firms from competition by larger firms
operating under more flexible statutes.
86. See supra Parts I(A)(5), I(B)(2).
87. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. EcoN.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 822 (1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). Farrell & Saloner have
identified analogous externalities of "excess inertia" (reluctance to switch from existing technology or
standard) and "excess momentum" (switching that strands "installed base" of users of existing
technology). See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and hInovation, 16
RAND J. ECON. 70, 71-72 (1985) (excess inertia); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and
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"network externalities" problem may inhibit the formation of new networks,
and so cause existing networks to become too large. In the business
associations context, new standard forms may never become successful
unless they borrow ill-fitting terms from existing forms solely in order to
have the benefits of case law and other interpretive materials that have been
developed in connection with these forms."8
There are several issues concerning the extent of any network externality
problem regarding statutory business forms. First, as discussed above,89
the existence of network benefits is questionable for statutory standard
forms. Second, any network benefits may not involve an externalities
problem in this context. State legislators and lawyers can encourage the
development of networks in ways that are not readily available to private
firms attempting to start technological networks. Lawyers can hold
continuing legal education programs on the use of a new standard form
even before any firms join the network. Lawyers earn general reputational
benefits from these efforts and can capture a share of any market for these
forms that should develop. Lawyers' marginal time costs of presenting and
attending these programs may be relatively low because all states require
lawyers to participate in continuing legal education.9"
C Herding and Limited Information
State lawmakers may engage in "herd behavior" in enacting LLC or
other new business associations statutes by ignoring their private informa-
tion and applying terms from earlier statutes or from other standard
forms. 1 This practice inhibits formation even of those new statutory
"networks" that firms would be willing to join. The main question
Compatibitv: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 940 (1986)
(excess momentum). Liebowitz & Margolis argue that network externalities may not be as widespread
as these authors suppose. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An
Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The
Fable of the Keis, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990).
88 See Ribstein, supra note 18 (discussing this reason for linking statutory forms).
89 See supra Part I(A)(5).
90 Although these efforts may encourage firms to adopt the new form, older forms may still
remain valuable because of their existing sets of interpretive materials. See Ribstein, supra note 18.
91 For theoretical treatments of herd behavior, see Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd
Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); David S. Scharfstein
& Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990). For an application
of this theory to judicial lawmaking, see Jason Johnston, Notes on the Economic Theory of Legal
Evolution (Mimeo, Vanderbilt University, 1993).
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regarding herding is whether legislators are irrationally disregarding
information or are acting rationally in view of their limited initial
information. It is not surprising that early-enacting lawmakers would be
uncertain about what types of new statutory forms to adopt. As more
information becomes available about the nature of the form, how firms are
using it and potential problems, later-adopting legislators may reach
different conclusions than their predecessors about the types of terms that
are appropriate. In this way, inputs from many jurisdictions will cause
efficient rules to evolve through innovation.92
Whether the herd hypothesis or the limited-information hypothesis best
describes the enactment of LLC statutes depends on whether later LLC
statutes evolve different approaches than the earlier laws. Part IV includes
data that sheds light on this issue.93
D. The Impact of Jurisdictional Competition
The power of particular groups to enact self-interested legislation, as well
as the impact of network externalities, limited information and herding,
ultimately depends on the extent to which jurisdictions compete to provide
LLC legislation. Jurisdictional competition provides new information about
LLCs and gives legislators incentives to do something more than play
follow-the-leader. More importantly, any attempt by legislators and lawyers
to reap selfish gains from LLC statutes could meet the same fate as special
chartering-that is, erosion of inefficient rules by competition among the
states.94 The earliest general incorporation statutes may have resulted from
high potential gains by interest groups and relatively low lobbying costs.95
Even where these circumstances did not exist, legislators had an incentive
to stem the loss of incorporations to general incorporation states, and the
consequent loss of revenues96 and legislative control over local firms, by
92. See Martti Vihanto, Competition Between Local Governments as a Discovery Procedure, 148
J. INST. & THEO. ECON. 411, 415-17 (1992). For an illustration of how such a process worked in the
context of federal procedural rules, see Bruce H. Kobayashi, Jeffrey S. Parker and Larry E. Ribstein,
The Process of Procedural Reform: Centralized Uniformity vs. Local Experimentation (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington University Law Quarterly).
93. See infra Part IV(C).
94. See Butler, supra note 77.
95. See William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in
the Economics of Legal Change, 23 ECON. INQ. 585, 593 (1985).
96. Revenues from incorporations accrue generally to taxpayers, who are a relatively
uncoordinated, and therefore weak, interest group. But these fees can be valuable to legislators because
they can be tapped to fund projects for powerful constituents without legislators' having to levy
unpopular taxes. I thank William Camey for this insight.
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enacting competing general incorporation statutes.97 In short, the statutes
relating to closely held firms and other private contracts emerge from a
combination of political forces and jurisdictional competition.98
It is not clear, however, to what extent jurisdictional competition
constrains political rent-seeking with regard to LLC statutes. The demand
side of jurisdictional competition requires, among other things, that actors
be mobile," while the supply side requires that legislators have incentives
to compete for formation business."° Academics have debated whether
and to what extent jurisdictional competition generally leads to efficient
results regarding public corporation statutes. William Cary claimed that
state competition for corporate charters was a vigorous "race to the bottom"
because the chartering choice was made by self-interested managers."'
But Ralph Winter showed that, because efficient capital markets gave
managers incentives to choose the most efficient governance terms, the
competition for corporate charters is a "race to the top." 02
Even if jurisdictional competition generally leads to efficient public
corporation law, it may not operate effectively with regard to closely held
firms. First, Ian Ayres argues that close corporations' relative immobility
affects the demand for close corporation legislation.0 3 Foreign incorpora-
tion imposes registration costs, exposes firms to suits in remote jurisdic-
tions and makes unavailable intrastate financing that is exempt from the
federal securities laws. Close corporations ordinarily lack incentives to
incur these costs because they can get most of what they want by adapting
the default provisions of their residence-state's law. Large multistate firms,
97. See Shughart & Tollison, supra note 95, at 591.
98. See Larry E. Ribstein, Efficiency, Regulation and Competition: A Comment on Easterbrook
& Fischel's Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 254 (1992) (discussing generally
this dynamic perspective on corporate law).
99. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23,
34 (1983); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECoN. 416 (1956).
100. For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete?
The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130 (1991).
101. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L J 663 (1974).
102. See RALPH K. WINTER, JR., GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Ralph K. Winter,
Jr, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977).
103. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 375-76. Roberta Romano has argued that legislators might not
actively supply statutes for closely held firms because there is no transaction-cost justification for such
statutes. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In this situation, the absence of statutes would be
consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, and the presence of such statutes would be consistent with
either the regulatory or inefficiency hypotheses.
19951
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
on the other hand, pay these costs anyway in all but one state in which they
transact business and have scale economies that can absorb the costs.
Second, Ayres argues that, even if close corporations could move their
incorporation state relatively cheaply, legislators would have little incentive
to supply close corporation statutes because judicial decisions on close
corporation issues could reduce the value of the state's corporate precedents
for public corporations. Among other problems, the meanings of statutory
provisions may be clouded by applying the same provisions to the different
public and close corporation contexts.' °4
Third, even if state legislators do compete to supply statutes for closely
held firms, there will not necessarily be a race to the top. No active stock
market provides an efficient pricing mechanism to discipline the close
corporation charter market. But this may not be a problem because owners
are actively involved in managing closely held firms, and therefore need
not rely on a public market to discount governance information in share
prices. On the other hand, the choice might be determined by lawyers who,
as discussed above,"05 may have self-interested reasons for selecting
particular types of LLC statutes.
The following discussion of specific conditions for competition in the
context of closely held firms shows that, despite the concerns raised above,
there are reasons to believe that there will be a race to the top in this
context.
1. Firms' Mobility and the Conundrum of Fees
In arguing that there is less jurisdictional competition for close
corporations than for public corporations, Ayres relies on close
corporations' high regulatory and tax costs of foreign incorporation. But it
does not necessarily follow that competition will be limited or nonexistent.
To see this, it is helpful to delineate the factors firms will consider in
choosing foreign incorporation. A firm's decision to incorporate outside its
residence state (i.e., the state in which its principal place of business is
located) depends on (a) the fees and other charges or penalties the residence
state imposes on foreign firms operating in the state; (b) the incorporation
104. For example, in Whetstone v. Hossfeld Manufacturing Co., 457 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Minn.
1990), the court applied an appraisal right provision to permit a close corporation minority shareholder
to dissent from an amendment of the articles of incorporation. This case raises the question whether a
public corporation shareholder would be able to dissent in the same situation, and increases the
uncertainty of the appraisal right for public corporations.
105. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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fees and taxes charged by the nonresidence state; (c) the transaction and
other costs of foreign incorporation; (d) the transaction cost advantage of
organizing under the other state's law; (e) the incorporation fees and taxes
charged by the residence state; and (f) the costs of avoiding foreign
incorporation. A firm will choose foreign incorporation if (a + b + e) < (d
+ e + f). This simple formula clarifies that firms will organize elsewhere
if the nonresidence state can offer a transaction cost advantage or lower
organization costs and fees."° In short, state competition can explain why
legislators do not exploit close corporations' captivity by increasing their
franchise taxes.
Ayres' suggested limits on state competition overlook the availability not
only of better corporation statutes, but also of alternative types of business
forms. Ayres suggests that states could limit this form of competition by
charging more for these other forms.107 But firms might respond by
adopting nonstatutory contracts, such as partnership agreements with
nonrecourse provisions.' While these contracts are more costly and less
reliable than adopting statutory limited liability forms, if the organization
fees were high enough, the savings would offset these additional costs.
Also, as illustrated by the development of LLCs and LLPs, states could
compete for out-of-state business with noncorporate statutory forms. To be
sure, these forms are relatively risky for interstate business in the absence
of an entrenched "internal affairs" rule that applies the law of the
incorporating state. But common law choice-of-law rules and constitutional
rules may provide some protection." Moreover, LLCs might have
statutory protection as foreign corporations and limited partnerships ° or
106. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 374-75. The loss of the federal intrastate securities exemption
probably is not a significant factor in light of the availability of other securities exemptions for closely
held firms. See, e.g., S.E.C. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 501-508 (1994).
107. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 374-75.
108 See generally Ribstein, supra note 43.
109. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CoRP. L. 245 (1993)
(discussing general choice-of-law and constitutional issues); Ribstein, supra note 4 (discussing impact
on contractual choice of law of recent statutes in Delaware, New York and Texas providing for
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses).
110. This was apparently an impetus for the first post-tax-ruling statute, in Colorado. According to
a Colorado lawyer active in the development of LLCs in that state:
Many thought that the LLC should attempt to comply with the foreign corporation certificate
of authority or registration law of the non-LLC state. The Secretary of State (Corporation
Commission or whatever) would then say either (a) that the LLC could not file which would
tend to prove they were not required to file and could transact business without registration
or (b) that the LLC could file as a foreign corporation, which would tend to show compliance
with the corporation code of the state involved and give the LLC a basis to do business, take
title, claim limited liability like a corporation.
Letter from John Debruyn to LNET-LLC (Aug. 23, 1994).
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may be able to move their operations to states that have or will enforce
favorable law.
Finally, factor (f) in this formula indicates that some closely held firms
may be more likely to choose foreign state organization if, like national
firms, they have independent business reasons for operating in more than
one state. For example, even a relatively small firm that is based in Kansas
City, Missouri, and competes in a market that extends into Kansas may be
more likely to organize in Kansas than a firm with a similar-sized market
in the middle of the state-for example, in Independence, Missouri.
In short, states do not have natural monopolies over the business of
chartering closely held firns. A state that has no LLC statute, or whose
statute is clearly unsuitable for closely held firms, perhaps because it
includes a large number of cumbersome formalities and mandatory rules,
may lose fees and legal business to a state with a more hospitable
statute.' 1
2. Lawyers as Suppliers and Demanders of Legislation
Ayres' argument for limited interstate competition for close corporation
charters assumes that only the parties to these firms would demand such
legislation and only state legislators would supply it. This ignores, however,
the central role of the practicing bar in both demanding and supplying
legislation." 2 Lawyers have an interest in attracting and retaining transac-
tional and litigation business by having state-of-the-art business association
statutes in their state. Lawyers also may gain both from statutory provisions
that help lawyers at the expense of their clients" 3 and from provisions
that serve both lawyers' and clients' interests. For example, if statutory
11I. One indication of this competition is that California inserted a provision in its LLC statute
noting the urgency of competing for business with the vast majority of states that had already adopted
LLC statutes. This provision states:
This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into
immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity are: Limited liability companies may
presently do business in at least 43 of the United States. It is essential to the California
economy that the state provide an attractive business environment, which includes provision
for limited liability companies. In order to help stem the flow of business and jobs from
California, protect the rights of Californians dealing with limited liability companies, and
improve California's business climate and tax base, it is necessary that this act go into effect
immediately.
1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1200 (West).
112. For a discussion of lawyers' role in jurisdictional competition, see Ribstein, supra note 4.
113. See supra Part III(A)(2).
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standard terms reduce lawyers' costs of forming firms, at least some of the
reductions would be passed to the client in the form of lower fees. On the
supply side, these laws are often written by bar groups whose members can
earn general reputational benefits and specific client referrals by being
associated with the legislation.
There is a potential tension between lawyers' roles as demanders and
suppliers of statutes. Lawyers' incentive to supply legislation depends partly
on whether they are compensated in the form of increased fees. At the
same time, if lawyers benefit at their clients' expense, this decreases the
demand for the statute by the parties to firms. As a result of this tension,
the intensity of jurisdictional competition may depend to some extent on
whether it is driven by franchise tax revenues as well as by lawyers."1 4
3. Rewards for Competing
Jurisdictional competition depends partly on whether legislators or
lawyers can capture enough benefits from supplying legislation to at least
offset the costs in terms of time and other resources devoted to drafting and
the risk of losing political or client support because of failed experiments.
Legislative innovators may not be able to capture all of the benefits
because other jurisdictions easily can free-ride on their efforts by copying
successful legislation." 5 Yet much of the work is done by lawyers who
can capture general reputational benefits and specific client referrals from
their committee work even if their work product is copied by other
states.16
4. Effect on Incorporations of Publicly Held Firms
Ayres argues that legislators may refuse to adopt close corporation
legislation in order to protect their business from incorporations of publicly
held firms." 7 But Ayres also notes that the undesirable "spillover" effect
of close corporation legislation on public corporation statutes could be
114 See Ribstein, supra note 4 (elaborating this point).
115. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
I 16. See supra Part Ill(D)(2). William Carney suggests that, because lawyers do not internalize the
benefits of drafting corporate law, they have relied on the Model Business Corporation Act and only
engaged in sporadic corporate law reform. See William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A
Non-Delaware View of the Results of Competition (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
However, Delaware's first mover advantage and the presence of the MBCA may have discouraged
innovation in corporate law. Neither of these factors plays a role in LLC law.
117. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 395.
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contained by forcing closely held firms to organize under wholly separate
statutes."' Ayres says legislators are reluctant to provide such forms
because courts would nullify such an extreme limit on private ordering."9
But the states do compete to provide noncorporate business forms precisely
in order to avoid "spillover." This is an example of the "coherence" and
"gap-filling" justifications for separate statutory standard forms. 20
5. The Race to the Top
Even if states actively compete to provide statutes for closely held firms,
they will not necessarily "race to the top." For example, lawyers might
guide their clients toward statutes with complex, litigation-maximizing rules
that serve the lawyers', but not the clients', interests.12' Clients' private
benefits from being informed about statutes may be lower than their private
costs, and there is no efficient securities market that would discount
experts' judgments in the price. Yet clients can rely to some extent on
reputational signals of lawyers' skill and loyalty and lawyers may compete
to some extent on overall price.
E. Summary and Implications
This Part has shown that statutory standard forms for closely held firms
may not be developed consistently with either the efficiency or regulatory
hypotheses. Inefficient terms may result from a combination of imperfect
legislator incentives, interest group activity, defects in the market for state
laws, or externalities inherent in firms' demand for standard forms.
One possible implication of the inefficiency hypothesis is that statutory
standard forms should be produced by "superlegislatures" such as the
American Law Institute, the American Bar Association or the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. These bodies might
be able to overcome the inertia that prevents the promulgation of these
standard forms, to mute interest group activity, and to stimulate the
development of networks of standard form users. However, these bodies
respond to their own sets of misincentives" and could encourage the
118. Id. at 395 n.124.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part I(C)(1) & (2).
121. See supra text accompanying note 82.
122. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process:
Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83, 120-25, 126-32 (1993)
(criticizing banks' influence on Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code); Larry E. Ribstein
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adoption of inefficient laws."2 In any event, there is evidence that state
legislatures tend to widely adopt uniform law proposals only in certain
situations in which uniformity is particularly appropriate.'24 This suggests
that proposed uniform statutes for closely held firms would not be widely
adopted, because closely held firms have diverse needs and these firms
normally operate in only one state and so do not risk having to comply
with inconsistent state laws.
A second implication of the inefficiency hypothesis is that courts should
pick up the slack left by statutes by taking an active role in providing rules
for closely held firms. They would, among other things, nullify restrictions
on use of the statutes'25 and ignore statutory limitations on remedies such
as dissolution on petition by minority holders. The problem with this course
of action is that, if the efficiency or tax/regulation hypothesis is correct, the
judicial nullification of statutes would be inefficient.'26
Since their actions could produce perverse results, courts and
policymakers should act on the inefficiency hypothesis only if it is
supported by strong evidence. The following Part discusses data produced
by the recent evolution of the LLC.
IV. EVIDENCE FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LLC
This Part discusses the rapid adoption and evolution of LLC statutes in
the wake of a tax ruling that reduced the costs of limited liability. This Part
also examines the implications of this development for the theories of
statutory forms discussed in Parts I-III. Subpart A gives a general historical
& Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming
1996); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 22 (discussing misincentives concerning promulgation of
uniform LLC act); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4,
42 ALA L. REV. 551 (1991) (same); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Restatement-Type Lawmaking Processes: An Analysis of the UCC and the Proposed Revisions to
Article 2, 143 U, PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (analyzing the work of the American Law Institute and
NCCUSL, focusing on the Uniform Commercial Code).
123. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 122.
124. Id.
125. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 395.
126 Although a statute that is shaped by tax and regulatory considerations may increase transaction
costs in other respects, a court cannot correct this problem without compromising the statute's tax and
regulatory objectives. For example, if a statute provides for dissolution at will for tax classification
reasons, a court that attempted to reduce the transaction costs of this provision by interpreting the statute
to provide for continuity of life would thereby insert the very feature the statute's drafters deliberately
and rationally sought to avoid.
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overview, while subpart B discusses the process in more detail. Subparts
C and D provide data on the terms of LLC statutes and on firms' adoption
of the LLC form. In general, the history of the LLC tends to support the
efficiency hypothesis. State legislatures rapidly have evolved statutes for
closely held firms that match what would be predicted under the efficiency
hypothesis-that is, internally consistent sets of provisions combining
limited liability and decentralized management. The pace of statutory
innovation tends to support the existence of jurisdictional competition.
Moreover, the speed with which firms have switched to the LLC form
tends to suggest that network externalities are not a strong impediment to
the development of new statutory business forms. At the same time, the
history of LLCs, the timing of adoption by firms of the LLC form, and the
structure of LLC statutes support the tax/regulation hypothesis.
A. Historical Overview
Prior to the advent of the LLC, owners of closely held firms were forced
to choose from among several not completely satisfactory alternatives.'27
In particular, corporate default rules such as centralized management, free
transferability and dissolution only by majority vote are ill-suited to many
closely held firms whose owners want to participate directly in control but
also to retain the option of exiting the firm. Also, corporations are subject
to costly double taxation on income at the firm level and at the distribution
level. Partnership offered favorable organizational rules and tax treatment,
but at the significant cost of unlimited liability.
Courts and commentators long ago recognized the need for a limited
liability business form that was better suited than the corporation to the
needs of closely held businesses. 8 Closely held firms could obtain
partial limited liability through limited partnerships. However, the limited
partnership "control rule" can be quite costly for the typically active owners
of closely held firms. Judicial changes in corporation law" 9 followed by
legislative adoption of special close corporation provisions 3' facilitated
use of the corporate form. But relatively few firms formed statutory close
127. These problems are reviewed in more detail in Ribstein, supra note 5, at 418-25.
128. For a leading early article, see Edwin J. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corpora-
tion-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L. 1145 (1966).
129. See Ayres, supra note 4, at 378-88 (tracing and analyzing judicial nullification of legislative
restrictions on adaptation of the corporate form for use by closely held firms).
130. For a comprehensive review of these provisions, see Dennis S. Karala, A Second Look at
Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEX. L. REv. 1207 (1980).
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corporations. 3' That may have been for one or more of several reasons:
the statutes included unnecessary formalities and restrictions;132 close
corporations remained at least partly subject to unsuitable corporate default
rules; firms perceived strong interpretive benefits in the case law and
customs that were associated with the existing corporate and partnership
"networks"; 33 or firms would have to incur costs in the form of filing
fees and legal costs of examining and revising existing agreements. In any
event, the close corporation statutes apparently did not offer enough of a
benefit over current forms to offset the costs of making the switch.
Firms and legislators were constrained from innovating new types of
limited liability firms because of uncertainties about whether these firms
would be characterized as corporations under the tax classification rules'3 4
and about whether the firms' limited liability would be recognized outside
the formation jurisdiction. A state that does not explicitly authorize
"foreign" firms to transact business locally may, under general choice-of-
law principles, refuse to apply the law of a state the parties have chosen in
their contract if the chosen law lacks significant contacts with the contract
or conflicts with the forum's policies. 3 ' Applying these principles, a state
might not recognize the limited liability or other features of new business
forms.
13 6
Wyoming adopted the first LLC statute in 1977 in response to a request
by an oil firm that had used Panamanian limited liability companies and
wanted to use a U.S. entity for an international oil and gas exploration
venture.'37 During the next eleven years, only one other state-Florida,
in 1982-followed Wyoming's lead.
In 1988 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) decided to classify an LLC
as a partnership for tax purposes. 3 8 By the fall of 1994 all but three
states had adopted LLC statutes. All of these statutes provide for limited
131. See I F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.18
(3d ed. 1986); Mike Harris, Comment, Assessing the Utility of Wisconsin's Close Corporation Statute:
An Empirical Study, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 811.
132. See Kaijala, supra note 130, at 1267-68.
133. See supra Part I(B)(2) (discussing these network benefits).
134. See supra Part II(A).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
136. See, e.g., Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468, 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (refusing
to recognize the limitation of liability of an Oklahoma business trust).
137. See William D. Bagley, The History of the LLC in the USA, 8 PUBOGRAM no. 3, at 15 (July
1994).
138. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360-61 (1988). The tax administrative history leading up
to this ruling is briefly reviewed in Ribstein, supra note 5, at 425-26.
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liability'39 and the vast majority provide for a default rule of direct
management by members.1 4' Thus, soon after the lifting of tax constraints
the states adopted a discrete business association for closely held firms that
combines limited liability and direct management.
The roles of the efficiency and other hypotheses of closely held business
forms discussed in Parts I-III emerge more clearly from the history and
data on LLC provisions discussed in the next two subparts.
B. Factors Motivating LLC Legislation
This subpart discusses in more detail the history of LLCs and its
implications for the hypotheses concerning statutory forms discussed in
Parts I-III. It shows that some history, including the rapid evolution of LLC
statutes, tends to support the efficiency hypothesis, while other history
supports the tax and inefficiency hypotheses. This ambiguity makes more
important the data presented in subparts C and D on the terms of LLC
statutes and on LLC formations.
1. The Effect of the Change in Tax Rules
The timing of the adoption of LLC statutes strongly suggests that it was
provoked by the change in tax rules announced by the Revenue Ruling on
the Wyoming statute. The initial Wyoming statute had been in existence for
eleven years when the IRS changed the tax status for LLCs. It is potentially
significant that states waited until the tax ruling rather than achieving the
same thing in effect in other ways. For example, Georgia passed something
very similar to an LLC act by dropping the "control rule" from its limited
partnership statute in 1988, but this move was not followed by any other
states. One reason may be that Georgia's statute did not receive the IRS'
ruling ensuring partnership classification until 1991, after the evolution of
the LLC was well underway.'
139. See generally 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, ch. 12.
140. The exceptions, of those statutes which include a default rule, are MINN. STAT. § 322B.606
(west Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 2013 (Supp.
1995); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1995). The Minnesota and North
Dakota statutes permit members to take action that otherwise must be taken by managers, and permit
members to enter into member control agreements. See MN. STAT. §§ 322B.37, 322B.606(2),
322B.67; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-50, 10-32-69(2).
141. See Rev. Rul. 91-51, 1991-2 C.B. 434; Ribstein, supra note 5, at 465 n.220. On the other
hand, the states' failure to accept the dropping of the control rule may be attributable to the control
rule's importance from a transaction-cost standpoint. This would support the efficiency rather than the
regulatory hypothesis.
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The relationship between tax rules and statutory form may, however, be
more complex than the direct timing link suggests because it is necessary
to explain why the Wyoming Revenue Ruling occurred when it did. One
possible explanation is that the tax reform of the mid-1980s, by causing top
corporate-level tax rates to exceed top individual rates and eliminating the
lower "capital gains" rate on gains on the disposition of stock, made
corporate-type double taxation costly for more firms.142 As a result, firms
stood to gain more by pressing at the IRS level for a tax change that
provided for partnership-type taxation on limited liability investments. 141
2. Enforcing Jurisdictional Choice
The IRS' approval of LLCs as pass-through entities quickly spurred
legislative activity in several states. The new statutes included provisions
which clarified that the law of the formation state would be applied to
"foreign" LLCs. This quickly solved the problem of interstate acceptance
of this new form of limited liability.'"
3. Changes in Limited Liability Rules
The spread of LLCs also may have been partly attributable to changes
in legal rules regarding limited liability. These rules in effect reduced the
opportunity cost of limited liability by reducing the value of partners'
personal liability.
First, state courts extended the requirement that partnership creditors
exhaust partnership assets before proceeding against individual partners.
The exhaustion requirement defers partners' personal liability pending an
unsatisfied judgment against the partnership or a determination of
partnership insolvency. Partners gain the time value of this delay,
particularly if there is a below-market statutory interest rate. They also shift
to creditors the costs of pursuing individual partners, since without
exhaustion partners must pay judgments and seek indemnification or
contribution from their copartners. Creditors may have trouble obtaining an
142. See Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After 30 Years, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Fall 1988, at 99, 117-18.
143. It is not clear that there was an onslaught of requests for rulings. However, the IRS might have
foreseen increased pressure for a tax change and acted to protect its bureaucratic power by ensuring that
the process would be under its control, rather than that of Congress or the courts. In effect, the IRS by
bureaucratic action expanded the scope of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. Normally, such
expansion would be the prerogative of Congress. Indeed, LLCs have given rise to a large number of
revenue rulings and private letter rulings.
144, See Part IIH(D).
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unsatisfied judgment against the partnership or proving that the partnership
is insolvent. Claims against the partnership therefore can be settled by the
partnership or partners for somewhat less if exhaustion prevails than if it
does not.' 45
The traditional rule requires exhaustion only for joint (i.e., contract-type)
liabilities 146 and not for joint and several liabilities. 47 Several states
have modified the Uniform Partnership Act rule distinguishing joint and
joint and several liability'48 to prescribe joint and several liability of
partners for all partnership obligations.'49 Some courts have applied the
exhaustion requirement even to joint and several liability, particularly where
the applicable statute lets plaintiffs sue partnerships in the firm name along
145. Some recent New York cases have delineated what the plaintiff must do in order to pursue a
partner's individual assets. In U.S. Trust Co. v. Bamco 18, 585 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div. 1992), the
court held that the plaintiff need not actually pursue partnership assets, including a judgment owed the
partnership, as a prerequisite to reaching the partner's assets unless he seeks to dispense with joining
the partnership. Id. at 188. It is enough that the partnership cannot or will not satisfy the judgment. Id.
at 189. The court reasoned that partners, who have a right of indemnity and a right to participate in the
management and conduct of the partnership business and to inspect the books and to demand an
accounting, are in a superior position to creditors. Id. Similarly, in British Land (B of C), Inc. v. 43
West 61st Street Associates, 576 N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div. 1991), the court held that plaintiffs
obligation to marshall the partnership's assets was satisfied by the six executions it delivered to the
sheriff. Id. at 555.
146. See Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 271 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Illinois law); Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F. Supp. 855, 858-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (New York law); In re
Stanfield, 6 B.R. 265,267 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980) (Nevada law); In re Peck, 99 N.E. 258, 259-60 (N.Y.
1912); Ira Rubin, P.C. v.A. C. Kluger & Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Diamond Nat'l
Corp. v. Thunderbird Hotel, Inc., 454 P.2d 13, 15 (Nev. 1969); 2 BROMBERO & RIBSTEIN, supra note
23, § 5.08. Section 15(b) of the UPA makes partners jointly liable for "debts and obligations of the
partnership" other than those specified in UPA §§ 13 (wrongful acts, e.g., torts) and 14 (breaches of
trust), for which the liability is joint and several by UPA § 15(a). The obligations for which UPA § 15
creates joint liability include contracts and the obligations to perform them. See Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc.
v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Me. 1982) (Maine law) (obligation to
arbitrate pursuant to agreement); Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Civ. Ct.
1982).
147. See Catalina Mortgage Co. v. Monier, 800 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz. 1990) (en bane); Phillips v.
Cook, 210 A.2d 743, 746-47 (Md. 1965); Foster v. Daon Corp., 713 F.2d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Texas law).
148. See UPA § 15 (1914).
149. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-8-52 (1994) ("except as maybe otherwise provided by law"); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-215 (Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-60-115 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
8-15 (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-315 (Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-12-29 (1989);
MO. REV. STAT. § 358.150 (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 68.270 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-114 (1989); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15
(West Supp. 1995).
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with some or all the partners. 5 ' The courts can reach a similar result by
narrowly drawing the category of cases involving joint and several
liability.' The exhaustion requirement can be burdensome for the
creditor. Some New York cases even hold that fewer than all the partners
cannot be sued individually unless the plaintiff first obtains a judgment
against the partnership or shows that partnership property is insuffi-
cient.15 In other words, a complaint against individual partners fails to
state a claim unless it alleges partnership insolvency.'53 This forces the
150 See ILL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 2-41 1(b) (by implication from ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-
411 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (authorizing unsatisfied judgment creditor of partnership to enforce liability
of a partner)); Koppers Co. v. Mackie Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, 544 So. 2d 25, 26 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (by implication from LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2817 (partnership as principal obligor is primarily liable
for its debts) and 737 (partners may not be sued unless partnership is joined)); Leger v. Townsend, 257
So 2d 761, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Security State Bank v. McCoy, 361 N.W.2d 514, 515 (Neb. 1985)
(NEBi. REv. STAT. § 25-316 requires judgment against partnership and insufficiency of its assets before
execution against individual assets); Horn's Crane Service v. Prior, 152 N.W.2d 421,423 (Neb. 1967);
Hall v. Oldfield, 158 N.E. 191, 192-93 (Ohio 1927). For other cases reaching the same conclusion under
firm-name statutes without discussing whether the statute negates the exhaustion requirement, see
Sargeant v. Grimes, 70 F.2d 121, 122 (10th Cir.) (Colo. law), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 568 (1934); Heiden
v. Beuttler, I I F. Supp. 290,291 (N.D. Iowa 1935) (Iowa law); Leach v. Milburn Wagon Co., 15 N.W.
232, 233 (Neb. 1883) (Iowa judgment creditor failed to show no partnership assets in Nebraska); Young
v. Mayfield, 316 P.2d 162, 165 (Okla. 1957) (dictum); Fowler v. Brooks, 146 P.2d 304, 307 (Okla.
1944)
15 1. See Arbor Village Condominium Ass'n v. Arbor Village Ltd., 642 N.E.2d 1124 (Ohio App.
1994) (holding that, where the partnership, through agent, failed to disclose repairs in a condominium
sale, it was a partnership breach of duty, not partner breach, under UPA § 13, so that the creditor had
to exhaust remedies).
152. Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F. Supp. 855, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (New York law); Helmsley v.
Cohen, 391 N.Y.S.2d 522, 523 (App. Div. 1977).
153. Owen Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 563 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing
contract breach complaint against partners); Pine Plains Lumber Corp. v. Messina, 435 N.Y.S.2d 381,
384 (App. Div. 1981) (same); Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F. Supp. 657, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(same); Whittaker Corp. v. Calspan Corp., 810 F. Supp. 457, 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (New York law);
Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. 992, 1003-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying New
York law and declining to reinterpret New York rule despite argument that it was based on
misinterpretation of Wisnouse v. Telsey); Nate B. & Frances Spingold Found. v. Wallin, Simon, Black
& Co 585 N,Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that a cause of action for breach of contract does
not lie against an individual partner absent an allegation that the partnership is insolvent or otherwise
unable to pay its obligations, and error to permit plaintiffto amend complaint to allege the partnership's
insolvency since the mere possibility of insolvency is insufficient to hold the individual partners liable).
For cases allowing suits to proceed against individual partners pending a later determination whether
the partnership assets are insufficient, see Propoco, Inc. v. Bimbaum, 550 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (App. Div.
1990); Midwood Dev. Corp. v. K 12th Assocs., 537 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (App. Div. 1989) (affirming
judgment against partnership and partner but noting that it "does not alter the longstanding rule that a
judgment creditor generally must look to partnership property first"); Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis,
451 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Civ. Ct. 1982).
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creditor at an early stage of the proceeding to establish facts concerning the
ultimate collection of the judgment, at the risk of later being forced to sue
the partners separately.
The expansion of the exhaustion requirement in state partnership law
works together with recent cases under federal bankruptcy law that also
tend to block creditors' direct access to partners' assets. Several cases have
enjoined actions by creditors of bankrupt partnerships against nonbankrupt
partners. 54 This in effect relegates creditors to a collective proceeding
unless they can preemptively strike solvent partners prior to the
partnership's bankruptcy.
Finally, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) endorses the
exhaustion rule by requiring creditors, except in certain situations, to
exhaust partnership assets before proceeding against the assets of individual
partners.'55 This is reinforced by a rule providing that partners' contribu-
tion obligations are enforceable by "a person appointed by a court to
represent creditors of a partnership."' 56 This suggests that the contribution
obligation is property of the estate, and therefore that actions by creditors
of the partnership against the individual partners may be stayed under
bankruptcy law.157 Although the RUPA has not yet been widely adopted,
it arguably reflects the current trends.
These changes in the law of personal liability reduced the impact on
firms' cost of credit of adopting limited liability. At the same time, they
may not equally decrease the costs to partners of personal liability, since
partners still have to incur the costs of monitoring the firm and their
copartners' wealth to guard against potentially disastrous personal liability.
Thus, expansion of the exhaustion requirement increases firms' incentives
to adopt a limited liability business form. To the extent that the develop-
ment of LLC statutes has responded to these changes in firms' transaction
costs, the development is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis.
4. Lawyers' Role
Lawyer groups have initiated proposals for LLC legislation and urged the
154. See generally Paul R. Glassman, Third-Party Injunctions in Partnership Bankruptcy Cases,
49 Bus. LAW. 1081 (1994).
155. See RUPA § 307(d) (1993).
156. Id. § 807(f).
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988).
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proposals through the legislatures.' This indicates that legislators' efforts
are not critical in producing jurisdictional competition. The bar's role does
not, however, clearly support either the efficiency or inefficiency hypothe-
ses of statutory standard forms, since the drafting lawyers could be serving
their own interests in increasing fees and fostering litigation rather than the
interests of their clients.
5. Changes in Demand for Limited Liability
The rapid spread of LLC and LLP statutes could be viewed as a response
to an increased demand for limited liability. To the extent that LLC statutes
respond to an underlying demand for limited liability, they are consistent
with the efficiency hypothesis. The increased demand for limited liability
could be attributable to greater exposure of accountants and lawyers to
securities law,159 malpractice and other forms of liability, particularly in
savings and loan cases."6 This expanding liability raised doubts about the
adequacy of traditional means, such as liability insurance, of protecting
professional partners' personal assets. 6 Moreover, partners cannot easily
protect themselves through monitoring from liability caused by a sudden
shift in the law.
158. The anecdotal evidence supporting this is the author's own work on LLC statutes and
statements made at meetings of the American Bar Association Section on Business Law, Partnership
Committee, Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies.
159. For a review of the expanding securities law liability of lawyers, see Marc I. Steinberg,
Attorney Liability Under the Securities Laws, 45 Sw. L.J. 711 (1991).
160, See Lisa Isom-Rodriguez, Limiting the Perils of Partnership, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1993, at
30 (noting that large settlements in savings and loan cases by law firms such as Kaye, Scholer and
Jones, Day spurred interest in limited liability partnerships, and quoting one lawyer as saying that the
Kaye, Scholer case was a "clarion call to action" on limited liability). Although securities law liability
is imposed directly on participants, it impacts on limited liability by reducing the firm's assets available
to pay other debts, including malpractice liabilities. This shift in demand is unlikely to be affected by
the Supreme Court's recent decision eliminating aiding and abetting liability under Rule lob-5 and
§ I0(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994). Firms still face potential direct liability under the
secunties laws, as well as both direct and aiding and abetting liability under banking and other laws.
For discussions of the implications of Central Bank, see Symposium on the Central Bank Decision: The
Demise of Aiding and Abetting?, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429-87 (1994).
161. See Dan L. Goldwasser, Damage Controlfor Professional Liability, CPA J., July 1991, at 16
(noting accountants' concern about expanding liability, particularly in the wake of the collapse of
liability insurer Lavanthol & Horwath). These concerns have been cited as an important reason for the
development of the limited liability partnership. See Robert Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 CoLo. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
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C. Data on LLC Statutory Terms
This subpart analyzes the provisions of LLC statutes for evidence
concerning the efficiency, tax and inefficiency hypotheses discussed in
Parts I-HI. The data discussed in this subpart tend to support the efficiency
hypothesis. Once some states adopted LLC statutes, other states could have
taken no action, copied another statute (such as the Wyoming statute that
was the subject of the 1988 IRS ruling), or enacted statutes that let foreign
LLCs operate locally. 62 But the data on adoptions demonstrate that LLC
provisions have evolved toward provisions that are consistent with the
efficiency hypothesis and away from earlier less efficient models. Newer
statutes and amendments to older statutes have tended to eliminate
undesirable mandatory rules, 63 and to replace rules that are appropriate
for centralized-management firms-the earlier model for limited liabili-
ty-with partnership-type rules that appropriately reflect the LLC's
decentralized-management default rule. The constant change itself suggests
the influence of jurisdictional competition. The evolution toward more
efficient provisions reflects the use of new learning about the LLC form
and is inconsistent with the notion that legislators are "herding" and
ignoring new information.
1. Management by Members
Virtually all LLC statutes have combined the features of direct
management'" and limited liability.65 The efficiency of combining
direct management and limited liability has already been discussed.'66
The pattern of adoption in this regard tends to refute the proposition that
state legislators are blindly following the leader. The first state to pass an
LLC statute after the Wyoming Revenue Ruling, Colorado in 1990, adopted
a mandatory centralized management rule. 67 Not only was this approach
rejected by every later statute, but Colorado itself recently changed its rule
162. Three states, Georgia, Indiana and Mississippi, did so. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-I to -19
(Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-16-10.1-4 (Bums Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-1001
to 1010 (Supp. 1994). All have been replaced by domestic LLC statutes.
163. The distinction between inefficient mandatory rules and mandatory rules that appropriately
restrict midstream opt-outs is discussed supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
164. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Part IV(A).
167. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401(1) (Supp. 1994).
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to make centralized management merely optional. 161
The one common element of LLC statutes that raises questions under the
efficiency hypothesis is their "menu" feature-that is, the ability to choose
between the decentralized management default and an alternative central-
ized management form. By providing for two types of management forms
in the same statute, this approach raises potential coherence and gap-filling
problems.'69 Many of the statutes attempt to address the coherence
problems by providing alternative sets of rules, concerning such matters as
agency power, for each of the management defaults. 7 However, these
statutes inevitably include some provisions, such as fiduciary duty rules,
that must do "double duty" by applying to both centrally managed and
member-managed firms. Moreover, courts must be careful to interpret the
statutes to fill gaps depending on whether the centralized-management or
member-management default rule applies.
Legislatures could adopt other types of menus that accomplish similar
results and raise similar problems. For example, some LLP statutes let
limited partnerships become LLPs, thereby giving them the option of
adopting one of two rules regarding the liability of the general partner. 7'
This option raises the same coherence and gap-filling problems as does
providing for alternative defaults within the LLC form. In light of these
inherent defects in the menu approach, it might be preferable to provide
distinct statutes for each of the default management rules. This could entail
the creation of a new statutory standard form that is, in effect, a centrally
managed LLC. This form would resemble a limited partnership except that
it would provide for default rules that both limit the liability of the general
partner and eliminate the "control rule."
168. See 1994 Colo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 94-107 (West) (amending COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-204(e)
(requiring statement in articles disclosing if LLC is managed by managers)and 7-80-401(1) (providing
for rules that apply if LLC is managed by managers)).
169. See supra Parts I(C)(1) & (2).
170. For example, most statutes provide that members have agency power only in member-managed
firms. See I RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, at 8-14 (tabulating provisions).
171. See, e.g.. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1553, 17-214 (Supp. 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8201(a) (Supp. 1994); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.14 (West Supp. 1995); id. art.
6132b-3.08(8); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-43.12, 50-73.78 (Michie 1993).
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2. Number of Members Required to Form
Some LLC statutes require the LLC to have at least two members.
72
The requirement is arguably consistent with the tax/regulation hypothesis,
since an LLC with one member may not be entitled to pass-through tax
treatment.73 The IRS, however, has ruled that the requirement is satisfied
for two-member firms organized under statutes that permit one-member
firms. 74 The requirement may also serve a regulatory function under
bankruptcy law, because it is not clear whether a one-member LLC may be
a debtor in bankruptcy. 75 Requiring two members therefore helps firms
avoid inadvertent consequences under tax and bankruptcy law.
The two-member requirement also is arguably consistent with the
efficiency hypothesis. A coherent LLC statute is well suited only to deal
with issues arising in associations of two or more members. For example,
unlike in a corporation, the death of the sole member probably would
trigger the uncertain consequences of dissolution.
The important question is whether the statute should allow a sole
proprietor to adopt the LLC form despite these transaction cost, tax and
regulatory problems. Mandating two members may be inefficient because
it denies sole owners the choice between the corporate form and the
somewhat more flexible LLC form. It also exposes LLCs to the risk of loss
of the limited liability shield or to inadvertent dissolution when a member
leaves or if there is a defect in membership.'76 Consistent with the
inefficiency hypothesis, mandating two members might be motivated by
lawyers' seeking to avoid potential malpractice resulting from inadvertent
loss of flow-through tax treatment.
172. See I RIBSTEIN & KEATING , supra note 7, § 4.03. Statutes are listed I Id. at 4-47. Some of
these statutes permit the firm to beformed by a single member, but require the formed LLC to have
more than one member. I id. at 4-4.
173. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.LB. § 4.01, at 21.
174. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991), 92-18-078 (Jan. 31, 1992) (determining that
association with two members entitled to partnership tax treatment although organized under Texas
statute that requires only one member). The IRS recently clarified that it will consider a request for a
ruling that an LLC is a partnership for tax purposes if, among other requirements, the LLC hag two
members. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. § 4.01, at 21.
175. A one-member LLC may not be an individual, partnership or corporation, and therefore not
a "person" under I I U.S.C. § 101(41) eligible for relief under id. § 109(b), (d) or (f).
176. See Marshall B. Paul & Stuart Levine, One-Member LLCs Pose Often-Overlooked State Law
Issues, 1 J. LTD. LiAm.rry Co. 162 (1995) (discussing problems under statutes that do not clearly
permit one-member LLCs).
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The following table summarizes states' adoption of two-member
requirements.
Table 1: Minimum number of owners: one member
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 0 4 0
1/92 2 6 25
7/92 2 12 14
1/93 2 16 11
4/93 4 17 19
7/93 7 25 22
1/94 8 28 22
12/94 14 34 29
As shown in Table 1, only two of eighteen LLC statutes permitted one-
member firms as of the beginning of 1993. As of the end of 1994,
however, fourteen statutes, more than a quarter of the total, permitted sole-
proprietorship LLCs. This rise may be partly due to increased tax
acceptance of the LLC, particularly the IRS rulings concerning two-member
LLCs under "one-member" statutes."77 Thus,'the tax purpose of the two-
member requirement has receded. Alternatively, under the efficiency
hypothesis, the need for flexibility in this regard became evident and
overcame lawyers' risk aversion. On the other hand, as explained above,
the two-member requirement is not clearly inefficient in light of tax and
regulatory considerations. This could explain why states have not rejected
the two-member requirement to the same extent as they have other tax-
related mandatory rules.'78
3. Formalities of Organization
Central filings that notify third parties of the firm's identity and its
owners' limited liability are cost-effective ways of providing important
information. 79 Nevertheless, there is no efficiency-based reason to make
this rule mandatory by denying limited liability to firms that contract for
limited liability with third parties but do not comply with the filing
requirement. In other words, LLC statutes are misguided to the extent that
177. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178. See infra Parts IV(Cx4) (discussing contracts allowing free transferability of management
nghts), IV(C)(8) (discussing contracts allowing continuity following a member's dissociation).
179. See Ribstein, supra note 43, at 107-08.
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they deny limited liability to firms that "assum[e] to act" as LLCs but do
not comply with the statute.' Such provisions in corporate statutes 8'
are better explained as politically motivated restrictions on limited liability
than on public interest grounds. 82 The only possible efficiency justifica-
tion for the rules is to ensure that firms comply with corporate governance
and other rules as a condition of obtaining limited liability." 3 This
justification makes no sense as applied to a flexible LLC statute. In short,
the rules are explained either by legislators' preferences for mandatory
formalities"8 or as blind application of corporate rules in an inappropriate
context.
Similar considerations apply to liabilities for erroneous certificates. Third
parties are sufficiently protected from misrepresentations by fraud law that
they do not need additional protection from erroneous certificates.
Nevertheless, limited partnership law generally requires members to amend
certificates that have become inaccurate. 85 Even if such requirements are
justified in limited partnerships,'86 LLCs differ critically from limited
partnerships with regard to the need for such a disclosure, since a limited
partnership certificate discloses the important fact of the identity of the
general partners who manage the firm and are personally liable for its
debts. Despite these considerations, several LLC statutes provide for
liability for erroneous certificates or for a duty to amend inaccurate
certificates. 87  These requirements arguably are consistent with the
inefficiency hypothesis.
180. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, § 4.15 (describing the provisions); I id. at 4-66
(tabulating state provisions).
181. See REVISED MODEL BUsiNESs CORP. ACT § 2.04 (1984).
182. See Ribstein, supra note 43, at 121-25.
183. Id. at 110-11.
184. See supra text accompanying note 76.
185. See RULPA § 202(c) (1985).
186. Even in limited partnerships, liability for inaccurate disclosures is of dubious value. Estoppel
and lingering partner liability provided for under the partnership laws for misidentification of general
partners in certificates is probably adequate, and additional liability is a potential trap for the unwary.
See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 879. Thus, the Georgia version of the RULPA has deleted the duty to
amend, see GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-202 (Supp. 1994), and does not include liability for inaccurate
statements.
187. See 1 RiBSTEmN & KEATiNGE, supra note 7, § 4.14; 1 Id. at 4-65 (tabulating state provisions).
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The following tables summarize states' adoptions of the provisions
described above:
Table 2: Penalties for noncompliance with formalities
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 3 1 75
1/92 6 2 75
7/92 9 5 64
1/93 10 8 56
4/93 11 10 52
7/93 15 17 47
1/94 16 20 44
12/94 17 31 35
Table 3: Liability for erroneous certificates
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 4 0 100
1/92 5 3 62.5
7/92 8 6 57
1/93 9 9 50
4/93 10 11 48
7/93 13 19 41
1/94 14 22 39
12/94 21 27 44
These tables show that LLC statutes have evolved away from prescribing
unnecessary formalities, consistently with the efficiency hypothesis.
4. Transferability
Limited transferability of LLC interests is internally consistent with other
elements of the LLC form. Under a decentralized management default,
transfer of management (as distinguished from financial) rights, can be
costly because of the risks of conferring management responsibility on
strangers. Transferees of management rights not only would have a say in
the day-to-day business but presumably also would have partner-like
agency power to bind the firm. Consistent with this analysis, all LLC
statutes provide for a default rule of restricted transferability."' 8
Many LLC statutes go further and limit the members' ability to contract
188. See I id. § 7.04; 1 id. at 7-35 (tabulating state provisions).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
for free transferability of management rights. 89 These limitations are
inconsistent with the efficiency hypothesis. Restrictions on transferability
necessitate costly negotiations for consent 90 and the potential that
members may opportunistically withhold consent.' 9 Moreover, the costs
of restricting exit may be particularly high if the members have given up
voice by opting for centralized management.
One explanation for mandatory restrictions on transferability is that
waiver might jeopardize partnership tax characterization. Yet, because the
transaction cost advantages of free transferability might sometimes
outweigh the tax advantages of restricting transferability, firms might prefer
statutory flexibility. Moreover, the IRS has ruled that the "corporate"
characteristic of free transferability is lacking in firms that restrict
transferability even if they are organized under flexible statutes 92 Thus,
mandatory restrictions on transferability cannot be explained by the
tax/regulation hypothesis alone.
The following table reflects the evolution of mandatory transferability
restrictions.
Table 4: Prohibiting contracts for transferability of management rights
Enacted by # adopting 3  # not adopting % adopting
1/91 3 1 75
1/92 5 3 62.5
7/92 7 7 50
1/93 7 11 39
4/93 8 13 38
7/93 13 19 41
1/94 15 21 42
12/94 19 29 40
189. 1 id. § 7.04.
190. In Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc., 802 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner
reasoned that the rule against restricting transfer in close corporations was based on the higher costs
of securing agreements to transfer. He expressed these costs mathematically in terms of an n-member
set as n(n-l)/2. Id. at 946.
191. For an example of a case in which the court refused to enforce a consent restriction on share
transfer where the nonconsenting member may have been withholding consent opportunistically in order
to obtain the shares cheaply himself, see Rafe v. Hindin, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 (App. Div.), affd
mem., 244 N.E.2d 469 (N.Y. 1968).
192. See Priv. Ltr Ruls. 92-19-022 (Feb. 6, 1992), 92-18-078 (Jan. 31, 1992). More recently, the
IRS increased tax flexibility of LLCs by adopting a Revenue Procedure which provides, among other
things, that an LLC does not have corporate-type free transferability if transfer must be approved by
at least a majority in interest of the members, or of the member-managers in a manager-managed LLC.
Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. § 5.02, at 23.
193. These numbers do not include statutes that require consent to be in writing.
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Table 4 shows that the percentage of LLC statutes allowing free
transferability of management rights has remained relatively constant but
has gradually dropped. Most of the flexible statutes were adopted after the
IRS rulings classifying as partnerships firms formed under flexible
statutes."9 The downward shift may also reflect the impact of jurisdic-
tional competition in overcoming lawyers' concerns about flexibility.95
The persistence of mandatory restrictions on transferability might be
explained on the ground that such provisions protect lawyers from exposure
to malpractice claims arising out of inadvertent tax mischaracterization.'96
Yet this does not explain why a higher percentage of states has allowed
contracts for continuing the LLC after member dissociation despite the
risk that this could create corporate-type "continuity of life" for tax
purposes.
1 97
Another possible reason for the persistence of restrictions on free
transferability may be legislators' concern that LLCs will use their freedom
to create publicly traded LLCs. Restricted transferability provides a
straightforward and easily applied method of separating publicly traded and
closely held firms for tax purposes, thereby cabining application of the
double corporate tax.19 Invading the corporate double-tax realm would
invite counterpressure from powerful interest groups that favor preservation
of the double tax"' that might jeopardize LLCs' tax status. This explana-
tion is consistent with the tax/regulation hypothesis.
5. Allocation of Management and Financial Rights
Equal (per capita) allocation of member voting and financial rights
correlates better with other elements of the LLC standard form than
allocating rights pro rata according to member financial contributions. Per
capita allocation is appropriate in a general partnership in which the owners
are personally liable for debts. Partners' personal liability gives them a
stake in the firm that can exceed their capital contributions and a commen-
194. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
195. Some evidence of the role of lawyers' concerns about flexibility is provided by a recent
Wyoming amendment which increased flexibility concerning transferability and other matters but added
a Governor's note that cautions lawyers concerning the possible tax implications of adopting such
provisions. See 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 79 (R-B. 79) (approved Feb. 20, 1995).
196. See supra text accompanying note 81.
197. See infra Part IV(C)(8).
198. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 472.
199. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 62.
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surate incentive to monitor, and therefore to contribute services to the firm.
Per capita sharing also may be an appropriate default rule for LLCs
despite their limited liability. First, it correlates with the direct-management
default of most LLC statutes.200 Under this default, the members ordinari-
ly make service contributions for which a pro rata rule would not
adequately compensate them. Although service and credit contributions
might be compensated through pro rata sharing by defining contributions
on which the sharing is based to include promised or rendered services,
expanding the definition of contributions beyond conventional types of
property further complicates the valuation problems described below. Finns
that adopt centralized management can be expected to customize the firm
in other respects, including changing to a pro rata sharing rule.
Second, per capita sharing correlates with the restricted transferability of
LLC shares. By contracting out of the exit option, members rely more
heavily on active participation in governance. This, in turn, makes it more
likely that the members will be making service contributions for which they
would expect to be compensated.
Third, per capita sharing avoids valuation and record-keeping problems
in closely held firms. For example, distributions complicate pro rata
sharing. Whether a distribution amounts to a return of a contribution, and
therefore a reduction of the member's share, may require a determination
of whether the distribution reduced the value of the firm below that of the
value of the contributions. This may not be a problem among existing
members as long as all distributions are pro rata. But it complicates
apportionment among new members and existing members who have
depleted capital accounts. Also, basing members' shares on the value of
their nonreturned contributions increases the need for accurate records of
contributions and distributions.
To be sure, LLCs' limited liability means that many LLC members will
be passive capital-contributors for whom pro rata sharing would be
appropriate. But the statutory default rule should be designed for informal
firms that are least likely to have customized agreements and careful
records. Accordingly, LLC statutes should provide for per capita sharing
unless the members provide both for contribution-based sharing and for the
maintenance of records from which members' contributions can be
accurately determined.
200. See supra text accompanying note 140.
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The following table summarizes states' positions on this issue.01
Table 5: Per capita allocation of voting rights
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 2 2 50
1/92 2 6 25
7/92 3 11 21
1/93 4 14 22
4/93 6 15 29
7/93 11 21 34
1/94 13 23 36
12/94 21 27 44
Table 5 shows that the statutes have evolved toward the per capita rule,
consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. Statutes began by carrying over
the pro rata rule from the corporate and limited partnership statutes. This
model may be more appropriate for corporations and limited partnerships
which provide for default centralized-management structures. As firms,
legislators and bar committees learned more about the inherent difference
in this respect between LLCs and other limited-liability forms, states
adopted LLC voting rules that reflect these differences. This is inconsistent
with the "herding" aspect of the inefficiency hypothesis. 2
The tax/regulation hypothesis may, however, have the last word
regarding allocation of voting rights. The IRS has taken the position that
requiring consent to transfer by holders of a majority of the financial
interests, rather than unanimous consent, does not amount to corporate-type
free transferability," 3 and that majority-in-interest, rather than unanimous,
consent to avoid dissolution after member dissociation does not constitute
corporate-type continuity of life.2 4 The RUPA incorporates the "majority-
201. See I RIBSTEIN & KEArINGE, supra note 7, at 8-49 (tabulating state statutory provisions).
202. See supra Part III(C).
203. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. § 5.02, at 23; 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATrINGE, supra note 7,
16 11, at 15-25 (reviewing earlier rulings).
204. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. § 5.01, at 23; 1 Ribstein & Keatinge, supra note 7, at ls-
28 to 29 (reviewing earlier rulings); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993)
(providing that corporate-type "continuity of life does not exist for a limited partnership notwithstanding
the fact that a dissolution of the limited partnership may be avoided, upon ... an event of withdrawal
of a general partner, by at least a majority in interest of the remaining partners agreeing to continue the
partnership"). The IRS also has provided a safe harbor definition of "majority in interest" for purposes
of voting on the continuation of a limited partnership. See Rev. Proc. 94-46, 1994-28 I.R.B. 129
(defining "majority in interest" for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) as majority of profit
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in-interest" rule for continuation of a general partnership.205 Some recent
LLC statutes also include this language.0 6 Because, as discussed above,
pro rata default rules increase transaction costs in the absence of tax
considerations, these provisions tend to support the tax/regulation
hypothesis. They do not strongly support the inefficiency hypothesis,
however, since the voting rules are not mandatory.
6. Adoption of Partnership-Type Agency Power
Because LLC statutes provide by default for partnership-type member
management, it follows that LLC members, like partners, should be able to
bind the firm if they are acting in the ordinary course of business.0 7
Nevertheless, many early LLC statutes either include no provision for
members' agency power, or provide simply that a member's act binds the
firm.2 8 The evolution of LLC statutory provisions is described in the
following table.
Table 6: Adoption of partnership-type agency power
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 0 4 0
1/92 0 8 0
7/92 5 9 36
1/93 6 12 33
4/93 8 13 38
7/93 17 15 53
1/94 19 17 53
12/94 29 19 60
The evolution of LLC statutes toward a partnership-type rule on member
agency power arguably reflects new learning by state legislators and bar
committees about the partnership-like characteristics of LLCs. It therefore
tends to support the efficiency hypothesis and refute the proposition that
interests and of capital interests).
205. See RUPA § 801(2)(I) (1994).
206. See N.Y. LTD. LiAB. Co. LAW §§ 602(b)(2), 604(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (transfer of
management rights); id. 701(d) (continuation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-901(c) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1995) (continuation). This trend can be expected to accelerate with the Revenue Procedure cited above
in notes 202 and 203.
207. For the partnership rule, see UPA § 9(l) (1914); RUPA § 301 (1993).
208. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, at 8-51 (tabulating state statutory provisions).
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legislators are engaging in "herding."2 °9
7. Fiduciary Duties and Remedies
Fiduciary duties and remedies should be designed so that they are
internally consistent with the other default terms of LLC statutes discussed
above. Because fiduciary duties are intended to reduce agency costs arising
out of owners' delegation of management responsibilities, their benefits
depend on how much management power members delegate to a subset of
owners or to nonowner managers. Without such delegation, owner-
managers presumably ought to be able to act selfishly and negligently.21
Even if members do delegate power, the benefits of fiduciary duties depend
on the existence of other constraints on managers' conduct, particularly
dissolution and buyout remedies. As other constraints reduce the marginal
benefits of fiduciary duties, these benefits are likely to be outweighed by
the costs of fiduciary duties, including direct litigation costs and indirect
costs of making managers more risk-averse than owners would prefer.211
It arguably follows from these general considerations that LLC statutes
should provide for a partnership level of fiduciary duties rather than a
higher corporate level,212 because the LLC default terms of decentralized
management, free transferability and dissociation at will minimize the
benefits of fiduciary duties and make corporate-type director duties
inappropriate. Moreover, given the members' flexibility to vary the form
of management, LLCs are likely to differ significantly regarding the level
of fiduciary duties that suits each firm. Accordingly, this is not an
appropriate area either for nonwaivable fiduciary duties or for specific
statutory defaults. The statute instead should leave the courts free to deal
with alleged fiduciary breaches on a case-by-case basis under a very
209. See supra Part III(C).
210. See Ribstein, supra note 37, at 52-55.
211 . As to potential costs from fiduciary duties and remedies, see generally Henry N. Butler &
Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH.
L REv. 1 (1990); Daniel . Fischel & Michael C. Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261
(1986); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation? 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 55 (1991).
212. For a discussion asserting that partners' duties are lower than those of corporate managers, see
Ribstein, supra note 37, at 53-55.
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general statutory default like that applied to partnerships under the
UPA.213
The following tables present data on LLC statutory provisions concerning
members' consent to interested transactions and waiver of fiduciary
duties.1 4 With regard to interested transactions, some statutes provide for
a partnership model allowing members to appropriate partnership property
for their personal benefit with comembers' consent, at least where the firm
is managed by members." 5 Other statutes include language similar to that
in corporate-type interested-director provisions. The partnership-type
language encourages courts to fill gaps by applying more appropriate
partnership precedents based on a model of decentralized management,
while the corporate-type language encourages courts to apply inappropriate
corporate precedents based on a centralized-management model. With
regard to waiver, Table 8 distinguishes between statutes that permit the
partners to contract fully regarding fiduciary duties and those that include
corporate-type limitations on waiver.
Table 7: Partnership rule for member consent to interested transactions
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 0 4 0
1/92 0 8 0
7/92 1 13 7
1/93 2 16 11
4/93 2 19 10
7/93 7 25 22
1/94 7 29 19
12/94 10 38 21
213. See UPA § 21(1) (1914) (providing that partners may not benefit from partnership property
without copartner consent). RUPA § 404 (1993) incorporates the UPA rule on self-dealing, but adds
a duty of care, an obligation of good faith, and specific rules on the duty of loyalty. For criticism of
this additional specificity as unnecessary and confusing, see Ribstein, supra note 37, at 52-55, 57-61.
214. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINCE, supra note 7, § 9.04 (discussing consent and waiver); Id. at 9.49
to 9-50 (tabulating state provisions). The table does not reflect statutes that do not include a provision
on this topic because noninclusion probably reflects the absence of a legislative judgment on the issue.
However, noninclusion is arguably efficient because it permits courts flexibly to fill in fiduciary duties
based on the specific contract.
215. The Pennsylvania statute provides for a partnership-type model in member-managed firms and
a corporate-type model in manager-managed firms. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8943 (Supp. 1994).
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Table 8: Permitting waiver of fiduciary duties
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 1 3 25
1/92 1 7 12.5
7/92 1 13 7
1/93 2 16 11
4/93 3 18 14
7/93 7 25 22
1/94 9 27 25
12/94 11 37 23
The evolution indicated by these tables supports the efficiency hypothe-
sis, although the trend is much clearer for the default fiduciary duties than
for the waiver rule. With respect to the default consent rule, as with other
aspects of LLC law, the evolution may reflect learning by state legislators
and bar committees about the partnership-like nature of LLCs. The different
history of waiver rules may reflect the fact that, while default fiduciary
duties should vary among business forms, there is no reason to distinguish
LLCs from other business forms regarding waiver of fiduciary duties.
Accordingly, there is no efficiency basis for expecting a distinct rule on this
issue to evolve for LLCs. Any apparent evolution may simply reflect the
fact that late-enacting states provided for waivers elsewhere in their
business associations laws.
8. Dissociation and Dissolution
LLC statutes provide that members can dissociate at will and, in the
absence of contrary agreement, can obtain at least a buyout of their
interests."' All states' statutes also provide that a member's dissociation
dissolves the LLC subject to the members' consenting to continue the
firm.217 These means of providing liquidity are internally consistent with
the limited transferability of LLC interests. LLC statutes should not
condition members' exit on grounds such as deadlock and oppression that
apply to close corporation shareholders. Courts and legislatures devised
216. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, §§ 11.02-11.03; 1 id. at 11-67 (tabulating statutes
on members' power to withdraw).
217. 1 id. § 11.05; 1 id. at 11-73 (tabulating statutes on continuation after member dissociation);
Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory and Planning Considerations for Withdrawal from an LLC, 1 J. LTD.
LIABILITY Co. 64, 65 (1994).
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these theories to mitigate the problems of applying corporate-type
continuity to closely held firms for which the standard corporate form is
inappropriate. By providing a clear alternative to close corporations in the
form of a default power to freely dissociate, LLC statutes signal courts to
fill gaps in statutes and agreements consistent with the partnership model
of free exit rather than with the corporate model of continuity.
Buyout and liquidation rights can, however, be costly. Among other
problems, these rights give each member the opportunity to appropriate
some of the value of the firm and are inconsistent with members'
expectations that assets would be committed indefinitely to the firm.218
As a result, liquidation at will may not be appropriate even in general
partnerships, where the right has long been recognized. 219 Dissociation at
will remains an appropriate default provision for the smaller, more informal
firms that would be most likely to operate without customized agreements.
The buyout right gives members some liquidity and thereby reduces the
risk that a controlling faction will take advantage of a "frozen-in" minority.
A statutory buyout right would eliminate the need for the sort of vague and
uncertain common law and statutory oppression and buyout remedies that
plague close corporations. Nevertheless, LLC members at least should be
able to contract around default dissolution and liquidation provisions.
Despite these considerations, the following table shows that many LLC
statutes do not allow LLCs to contract around the default rules.220 These
provisions arguably support the tax/regulation hypothesis in that they ensure
against corporate-type continuity of life for tax purposes. But for the
transaction-cost reasons just discussed, firms probably would prefer to be
able to contract for continuity. Accordingly, mandatory dissolution arguably
is consistent with the inefficiency hypothesis." t
218. See Ribstein, supra note 37, at 70.
219. See id; Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform
Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 111, 143-44 (1990); Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner
Dissociation, 65 WAsH. U. L.Q. 357, 373-75 (1987).
220. See 1 RiBsTmm & KEATiNGE, supra note 7, § 11.07; 1 id. at 11-74 (tabulating statutes on
members' power to vary statutory continuation right).
221. One possible explanation for such provisions is that they protect lawyers from potential
malpractice liability for misdrafting agreements that trigger unexpected tax consequences. See Infra text
accompanying note 81.
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Table 9: Prohibition of continuation agreements
Enacted by # adopting # not adopting % adopting
1/91 0 4 0
1/92 1 7 12.5
7/92 3 11 21
1/93 3 15 17
4/93 3 18 14
7/93 3 29 9
1/94 3 33 8
12/94 3 45 6
Table 9 indicates an evolution toward flexibility that supports the
efficiency hypothesis rather than the tax or inefficiency hypotheses.
Although there were never many statutes providing mandatory rules for
continuation agreements, the number of mandatory states has remained
steady even with the rapid increase in the total number of LLC statutes.
Note that, contrary to the tax/regulation hypothesis, this development
proceeded despite the Internal Revenue Service's initial failure to sanction
explicitly statutory provisions that permit flexibility in this regard. Indeed,
the IRS suggested that it might treat LLC continuation agreements more
stringently from the standpoint of corporate-type continuity than it has
treated limited partnership continuation agreements.2
There is further evidence against the tax/regulation hypothesis in the fact
that LLC statutes continue to provide for default buyout rights despite the
risk this poses of causing higher estate tax valuations for family limited
partnership interests.' The Internal Revenue Code provides that, in
valuing such an interest, contractual limitations on liquidation (which
otherwise would reduce the value of the interest) are ignored if they are
more restrictive than the statute. 4 Assuming these rules will be applied
222. See I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, at Is-28. Recently, the IRS mitigated this problem
by setting forth specific guidelines for when continuation provisions in an LLC's operating agreement
wil be deemed not to constitute corporate-type continuity of life for purposes of obtaining a ruling that
a firm will be classified as a partnership for tax purposes. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. § 5.01,
at 23.
223. See Ribstein, supra note 217, at 69.
224. See I.I.C. § 2704(b) (1988). This provision was passed primarily to reverse the result in Estate
of Harrison v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987) and Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 51
T C.M. (CCH) 60 (1985), aftd, 823 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987), which held that the interest could be
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to LLCs, an operating agreement that precludes withdrawal would be
considered to be more restrictive than state law if the LLC was formed
under a statute that provides for a default exit on designated notice.
Notably, in this situation it is the statute, and not the contract, which
matters for tax purposes.
The reason why LLC statutes have not eliminated this tax problem may
be that the family business problem is not important enough in the LLC
context to justify sacrificing transaction costs for regulatory objectives."z
The limited partnership may be more appropriate for this type of business
because the limited partnership control rule helps lock passive members out
of control. Rather than undertaking a drastic elimination of the default
power to withdraw in all firms, one LLC statute has addressed the problem
in a more limited way by including a special provision that applies to a
firm that elects to be a "family controlled limited liability company."26
These facts suggest that legislatures, perhaps motivated by jurisdictional
competition, are acting as faithful agents for firns by efficiently trading off
tax and transaction-cost objectives.
D. Data on Formation of LLCs
The following chart shows the numbers and times of formations of
LLCs, limited partnerships and corporations in five states. 7 The data
discounted for estate tax purposes if there was a decline in the value of the interest as a result of the
death that did not result in a transfer of the value to someone else. I.R.C. § 2704(b) provides that an
"applicable restriction" on liquidation rights can be disregarded in valuing the estate for tax purposes
even in the absence of a transfer of value. Id. Section 2704(b)(3)(B) provides that an "applicable
restriction" does not include "any restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by any Federal or
State law." Treasury Regulations define "applicable restriction" as one that is "more restrictive than the
limitations that would apply under the State law generally applicable to the entity in absence of the
restriction." Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1994). See generally S. Stacy Eastland, Valuation Planning
with Respect to Transfers of Partnershlp Interests Under Chapter 14; Transfer Tax Consequences of
Selected Partnership, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES, C819
ALI-ABA 109, 154-72 (1993).
225. Alternatively, lawyers may have mistakenly interpreted LLC statutes as restricting exit
whenever they provide for a fixed duration. See Ribstein, supra note 217, at 70. The statutes may be
amended to restrict exit if this interpretation is revised.
226. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-707(C) (Supp. 1994).
227. The filings have been determined through a search on the Westlaw Prentice-Hall database.
Accordingly, the numbers are not official counts, A cross-check is provided by the facts that the
Colorado data corresponds closely with data obtained from the Colorado Secretary of State, and that
data for all of the states is comparable with data the states supplied for INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF CORPORATION ADMINISTRATORS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JURISDICTION (1994). The states
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show that in all states examined there was a relatively rapid move to LLCs.
Moreover, since the numbers of new limited partnership and corporate
formations have remained relatively constant, the rapid increase in LLCs
probably represented conversions from these forms as well as from general
partnerships.2
The pattern of adoptions tends to refute the existence of significant
"network externalities."" It is significant that a considerable number of
firms switched from or avoided business forms with well-entrenched
uniform statutes and interpretive networks of case law, customs and
expertise. The rate of growth is similar in all states irrespective of when in
the general history of LLCs the state's statute was adopted. During this
period of rapid acceptance of the LLC form, there remained many
uncertainties concerning the rules that would be applied to LLCs. LLCs
represent both a novel combination of direct management and limited
liability and a novel hybrid of direct and centralized management for which
there were no developed internal governance and agency rules.23 More-
over, there were additional uncertainties concerning the tax treatment of
LLCs that did not quite fit the initial Wyoming Revenue Ruling,"' and
concerning LLCs' ability to operate outside their formation states.232
Nevertheless, fi-ms apparently were willing to incur uncertainty costs and
the costs of pressing for more statutes and for tax rulings that would clarify
examined were those in which current numbers for LLCs, limited partnerships and corporations could
be determined, and where LLC statutes have been in effect long enough to yield significant numbers
of formations. LLCs were first formed on the following dates in these states: Wyoming, 1977; Colorado,
Apnl 1990; Iowa, July 1992; Oklahoma, September 1992; Texas, June 1991. Limited partnership and
corporate figures are given for the years during which LLC filings occurred in each state.
228. Conversions to LLC form do not necessarily trigger tax consequences. See 1 RiBsTnm &
KI-ATINGE, supra note 7, § 17.13, at 17-58, 1S-46.
229. See supra Part Ill(B).
230. It should be noted, however, that LLC statutes are drafted with significant linkages to existing
forms in order to mitigate their novelty and carry over interpretive materials associated with existing
standard forms. See Ribstein, supra note 18.
231. See generally 1 RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, ch. 16.
232. LLCs had little guidance as to what law would apply to foreign LLCs in the absence of
explicit statutory provisions. A recent case illustrating the uncertainty in the case law is Abu Nassar v.
Elders Futures Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7906 (PKL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3794 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991).
In that case, the court held that foreign law should be applied to the requirements of the status of a
Lebanese "limited liability company," and local law may be applied as to a veil-piercing issue. Id. at
* 14. Thus, the court looked to both the law of Lebanon (the formation state) and of New York (the
operation state and the state whose law was designated by the parties to an agency contract). Id. See
generally 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 7, § 13.03.
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the law. This evidence strongly suggests that the failure of special close
corporation statutes cannot be attributed simply to network externalities.
Co-LLC Co-LP Co-Corp Ia-LLC Ia-LP Ia-Corp
164
488
989
2,828
4,815
668
707
896
992
1,079
13,990
14,991
16,362
17,365
17,908
Ok-LLC Ok-LP Ok-Corp Tx-LLC
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
309
304
354
Wy-LP
28
22
38
37
41
30
951
946
1,034
269
1,861
3,033
4,465
4,592
4,837
5,060
5,206
5,290
Tx-LP Tx-Corp
2,855
3,010
3,967
4,989
5,971
39,826
38,944
38,563
41,280
42,047
Wy-Corp
1,078
1,391
1,645
1,991
2,014
1,933
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The development of the LLC suggests questions and gives some tentative
answers relating to statutory standard forms for closely held firms. First,
LLCs provide insights into the functions that are served by these statutes.
This Article has shown that establishing alternative statutory standard forms
can provide an efficient contracting mechanism.
Second, the rapid evolution of the LLC demonstrates that jurisdictions
222
941
1,431
Wy-LLC
12
23
69
234
840
1,026
958
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compete for formations of closely held firms. Not only have the states
rushed to enact these statutes and firms rushed to organize as LLCs, but
over a very short period there has been a remarkable evolution of statutory
terms.
Third, the evolution of the LLC strongly suggests that the failure of
special close corporation legislation did not result from problems inherent
in state competition to provide statutes for closely held firms, or from
firms' reluctance to break away from established forms and interpretive
networks. Rather, the recent story of the LLC suggests that the failure of
special close corporation legislation prior to 1988 was attributable to
inflexible tax classification rules and questions about interstate recognition
of limited liability. Indeed, the LLC phenomenon could spell the end of the
close corporation business form. Close corporations temporarily accommo-
dated the corporate form to closely held firms while alternative forms were
unavailable for tax and interstate recognition reasons. This accommodation
has been imperfect in many ways. In particular, grafting close corporation
governance arrangements onto a form with limited transferability of
interests and no right of dissolution at will has forced the courts and
legislatures to adopt an awkward and ad hoc oppression remedy in order
to provide a right of exit. The LLC has made these makeshift devices
unnecessary.
The analysis and evidence in this Article has several important
implications beyond LLCs. Evidence of efficient jurisdictional competition
generally supports enforcing contractual choice of law. This evidence also
counsels caution about intervention in the law of closely held firms by
judges or by law reformers. If statutes define efficient standard form
contractual terms, judicial nullification can inefficiently abrogate contracts.
Moreover, the tables in Part IV(C) demonstrate graphically how pointless
and counterproductive it is for one set of uniform lawmakers to attempt to
write a "uniform" law of LLCs that improves on what can be produced by
the organic process of state competition. In short, allowing statutes of
different types and from different states to compete is preferable to a priori
judgments by regulators or reformers as to what rules should govern
business associations.
Additional implications concern the future of business forms for closely
held firms. It may be the case that LLCs, like close corporations, are a
transitional form. The next step toward increased recognition of limited
liability has been to include limited liability in the basic partnership form
by allowing general partnerships to register for limited liability as under
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LLP provisions." Beyond this, it may be that limited liability will
become a default term of the partnership form. The efficiency hypothesis
suggests that limited liability should be segregated into a separate standard
form and integrated with such features as filings and disclosures which are
appropriate only for firms that adopt limited liability. However, the
development of the LLP suggests that there may be tax and regulatory
reasons why limited liability would be incorporated into the partnership
form.
The latest tentative proposal by the IRS to make partnership tax
treatment available to all unincorporated firms23 signals that still more
changes are in the wind. This Article suggests that tax law has had
important effects on business forms. Freed from some of the current tax
constraints, statutory business forms could proliferate further. This proposal
could signal the beginning of a new corporate-type partnership, accelerate
the demise of the close corporation, or have other effects on statutory
standard forms that cannot now be predicted.
Finally, this Article suggests that it is time that data started playing more
of a role in prescriptions concerning closely held firms. More empirical
work remains to be done. Among other things, once LLCs have been in use
for some time it may be possible to test this Article's theory of the
functions of standard forms by identifying differences between the types of
firms that choose to organize as LLCs. For example, firms that manage real
estate and other properties may continue to organize as limited partnerships
even though the same tax advantages and more flexible management are
available through the LLC form. This would suggest that the control rule
and other mandatory limited partnership rules are, indeed, efficient for such
firms.
The data so far suggests that there is a "race to the top" in creating
statutory law for closely held firms, but the "top" is determined to some
extent by the tax and regulatory context in which these firms must operate.
It follows that the way to improve the law of closely held firms lies not in
more uniform laws, but in avoiding unnecessary tax and regulatory
constraints on the shape of firms.
233. See supra text accompanying note 8; Ribstein, supra note 71.
234. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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